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Main findings 
The issue of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality as indicated in the Paris Agreement is 
increasingly gaining interest among policymakers. However, key questions need to be 
addressed before the concept could be used. The Paris Agreement is aimed to keeping global 
warming to well below 2 °C and to pursue efforts to limit it further, to 1.5 °C. These targets, 
in themselves, do not provide any guidance for policymakers and investors about how to 
achieve them. As part of a stocktaking process, policymakers are looking into various 
reduction targets and policy measures that could contribute to the climate targets. The Paris 
Agreement also states the aim of global greenhouse gas (GHG1) emissions peaking as soon 
as possible, and of achieving a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century. The second aim is 
often referred to as the concept of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality. This publication 
discusses some of the relevant questions related to this concept. It includes an overview of 
the literature and of Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) runs and identifies knowledge gaps. 
It addresses the following three overarching policy questions:  
 
1. What are the main principles of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality—and what key 
open questions are related to this concept? 
- Greenhouse gas emissions neutrality is here defined as reducing global emissions of 
all greenhouse gases to net zero, and is distinguished from ‘climate neutrality’. 
2. What could be the global and regional implications of the emission pathways towards 
achieving greenhouse gas emissions neutrality? 
- Global greenhouse gas emissions are projected to reach net zero between 2080 and 
2100 and for CO2, this will be between 2055 and 2070, under scenarios that limit 
global warming to 2 °C with a 66% probability and that do not have technology 
limitations.  
- In most regions, greenhouse gas emissions are projected to peak by 2020, with the 
earliest achievement of net zero greenhouse gas emissions occurring in 2060.  
- Corresponding emission reductions by 2050 are 59% for China, 74% for the EU, 16% 
for India and 85% for the USA, relative to 2010. For the EU, this means reductions of 
47% by 2030 and 80% by 2050, relative to 1990 (including LULUCF CO2), noting 
that these results are for cost-optimal scenarios that do not account for fairness 
considerations. 
- Achieving the aspirational 1.5 °C target would further increase the reduction targets 
for all countries.  
- Effort-sharing studies that have calculated emission allowances by applying different 
equity principles to global emissions pathways consistent with achieving 2 °C or 1.5 
°C, show even larger reduction targets for OECD countries, including those in the EU. 
- Greenhouse gas emissions neutrality does not imply full decarbonisation, as 
remaining emissions can be compensated for by negative emissions from LULUCF 
sinks and through biomass used in energy production coupled with carbon capture 
and storage.  
- Therefore, regions with a large potential for negative emissions show earlier phase-
out years, although the allocation of negative emissions to either the biomass-
                                               
1 GWP-aggregated emissions of all Kyoto greenhouse gases. In the remainder of the report, greenhouse gas 
emissions include CO2 emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), unless indicated 
otherwise. 
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producing region or the region applying it with CCS does influence regional phase-out 
projections.  
3. What are the land-use implications of achieving greenhouse gas emissions 
neutrality? 
- The global area of land dedicated to energy crops varies across models, and is 
projected to be between 180 million ha and 1084 million ha by 2100, while the 
projected increase in global forest area, as a function of afforestation/reforestation 
and deforestation for bioenergy crops, ranges from 150 million ha to 820 million ha 
by 2100, relative to 2010. 
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Executive summary 
The issue of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality as indicated in the Paris 
Agreement is increasingly gaining interest among policymakers. However, key 
questions need to be addressed before the concept could be used. The Paris 
Agreement is aimed to keeping global warming to well below 2 °C and to pursue efforts to 
limit it further, to 1.5 °C. These targets, in themselves, do not provide any guidance for 
policymakers and investors about how to achieve them. As part of a stocktaking process, 
policy makers are looking into various reduction targets and policy measures that could 
contribute to the climate targets. The Paris Agreement also states the aim of global 
greenhouse gas (GHG2) emissions peaking as soon as possible, and of achieving a balance 
between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in 
the second half of this century. The second aim is often referred to as the concept of 
greenhouse gas emissions neutrality. This publication discusses some of the relevant 
questions related to this concept. It includes an overview of the literature and IAM model 
runs and identifies knowledge gaps. It addresses the following three overarching policy 
questions:  
 
1. What are the main principles of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality—and what key 
open questions are related to this concept? 
2. What could be the global and regional implications of the emission pathways towards 
achieving greenhouse gas emissions neutrality? 
3. What are the land-use implications of achieving greenhouse gas emissions 
neutrality? 
What are the main principles of greenhouse gas emissions 
neutrality—and what key open questions are related to this 
concept? 
There are a set of concepts related to greenhouse gas emissions neutrality. The 
concept of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality refers to the moment that the sum of all 
greenhouse gases (Kyoto gases) reaches zero. This is sometimes also referred to as climate 
neutrality. It should be noted that greenhouse gas emissions neutrality is defined by a sum 
of different emission categories, including energy-system CO2 emissions, land-use related 
CO2 emissions and non-CO2 emissions. Some of the emissions are difficult to reduce. They 
can be compensated, however, by so-called negative emissions, i.e. CO2 removal from the 
atmosphere. This can be done in different ways, including through the combination of bio-
energy and CCS (BECCS), afforestation/reforestation, enhanced weathering and additional 
storage of carbon in soils. The combination of these different sources and sinks can lead to 
“greenhouse gas emissions neutrality” (see Figure S.1). On the basis of the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report and Levin et al. (2015a), some related concepts can be defined:   
 Carbon neutrality: Reduce global annual anthropogenic CO2 emissions to net zero 
(see net-zero carbon emissions below); achieved between 2055 and 2070 
                                               
2 GWP-aggregated emissions of all Kyoto greenhouse gases. In the remainder of the report, greenhouse gas 
emissions include CO2 emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), unless indicated 
otherwise. 
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 Global carbon budget: Remaining amount of cumulative CO2 emissions to meet a 
climate target.  
 Net-zero carbon emissions: Situation in which anthropogenic removal of CO2 exceeds 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions. 
 Net-zero greenhouse gas emissions: Reduce emissions of all greenhouse gases to net 
zero between 2080 and 2100 (see also climate neutrality).  
 Peaking emissions: Year of peak in global greenhouse gas emissions 
 Percentage of emissions reduction by a certain date 
 
Figure S.1. Pathways of global greenhouse gas emissions (GtCO2eq/year) in 1.5 °C 
scenarios of the IMAGE integrated assessment model.  
 
 
Source: This study, based on Van Vuuren et al. (2018)  
 
There are different ways to define greenhouse gas emissions neutrality. As the 
concept of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality is defined as the sum of greenhouse gas 
emissions being zero, it directly depends on the use of metrics that equate the contribution 
of different greenhouse gases. The use of 20, 100 or 200-year global warming potentials 
(GWPs) or other equivalence metrics directly defines the moment in time “greenhouse gas 
emissions neutrality” is reached. This is also true for the way land-use related emissions are 
accounted for. 
 
There is large uncertainty in land-use related CO2 emissions, while also different 
definitions are used. Land-use related CO2 emissions are very uncertain and researchers 
use different methods to estimate the emissions. It should also be noted that there are 
different ways to distinguish between natural and anthropogenic land-use related CO2 
emissions. In models, usually land-use related emissions are defined on the basis of land-use 
change. In contrast, in the reporting of most countries under UNFCCC, all changes in CO2 
stocks in managed forests are counted as anthropogenic. This thus includes the removal of 
additional CO2 from the atmosphere by existing forests, which is accounted for as a natural 
CO2 flow in most models. These definitions have a relatively small impact on total CO2 
emissions right now, but can strongly influence the overall emissions once other sources are 
reduced to near-zero (and thus the year greenhouse gas emissions neutrality is reached). 
 
Further discussion on how to account for negative emissions is needed. A key source 
of possible negative emissions is BECCS. In BECCS application, the CO2 removal physically 
takes place during biomass production (‘at the field’). In accordance with the concept of 
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accounting for ‘normal’ CO2 emissions at the place of combustion, most models also assign 
negative emissions to the regions where combustion takes place. Clearly, how to properly 
assign negative emissions still needs to be discussed further. The year of greenhouse gas 
emissions neutrality of different regions strongly depends on these accounting tools. 
 
While the concept of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality provides an attractive 
formulation of long-term ambition of different countries, further discussion is 
needed on how to best define this concept. In the previous conclusions, we discussed 
several issues that strongly impact results. Further discussion on how to best deal with these 
issues is needed. In the remainder of this summary, we illustrate possible outcomes, also in 
light of these uncertainties. 
What could be the global and regional implications of the 
emission pathways towards achieving greenhouse gas 
emissions neutrality? 
When would global greenhouse gas emissions need to reach net zero, under 2 °C 
scenarios? 
The form of the emission profile strongly depends on societal choices regarding overshoot 
and timing and the availability of different technologies. The AR5 report indicates, using the 
full set of scenarios available at the time, that global greenhouse gas emissions would need 
to reach net zero between 2080 and 2100, in order to stay within the 2 °C limit with a 66% 
probability. This conclusion, however, depends on the assumed negative emissions and the 
possible overshoot. In any case, CO2 emissions would need to reach zero earlier. In optimal 
scenarios this happens between 2055 and 2070, but this depends on the assumed starting 
date of cost-optimal reductions that are to achieve this goal.  
 
What does greenhouse gas emissions neutrality mean, with respect to CO2 and 
non-CO2 emissions?  
Greenhouse gas emissions neutrality does not imply full decarbonisation, as the remaining 
emissions of CO2 in the transport, industry and building sectors, and of non-CO2 greenhouse 
gases, mostly in agriculture, can be compensated for by negative emissions from LULUCF 
sinks (mainly forests) and through the use of biomass in energy production coupled with 
Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS). 
When would national and regional greenhouse gas emissions need to reach net 
zero, under 2 °C scenarios?  
We have discussed earlier that regional projections of phase-out years depend strongly on 
how negative emissions achieved through BECCS are allocated: to the region producing the 
biomass, or to the region applying it with CCS? Using the latter definition (consistent with 
the IAM models), the earliest achievement of net zero greenhouse gas emissions occurs in 
2060, and of net zero CO2 emissions in 2050, for some regions, while most regions are 
projected to reach net zero later, based on the analysis of model scenarios of the LIMITS and 
AMPERE projects (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015). For regions with larger shares of 
non-CO2 emissions and/or less potential to create negative emissions, this moment occurs 
later in time.  
Differences in land-use accounting methods strongly affect the year greenhouse 
gas emissions neutrality is reached. As indicated earlier, uncertainty in land-use related 
CO2 emissions is large, while this is confounded by the different definitions that are used. 
The EU, China and the United States report carbon sinks for managed forests, which are 
projected to remain more or less the same in the future. Models, however, consider this to 
be a natural CO2 sink caused by carbon fertilisation. This discrepancy can be removed by 
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harmonising definitions. It is possible to get some idea of the impact of this definition of 
‘harmonisation’ by, in this case, adding the absolute emissions difference in 2010 between 
the inventory data and the model data to the model projections (see Figure S.2). This leads 
to shifting the absolute values of the emission projections up or down, without changing the 
trend.  
 
Figure S.2. Effect of harmonisation on the emission pathways for land use CO2 
emissions, in delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios, per model and region. 
Source: This study.  
 
 
Unharmonised model land use CO2 emissions (blue), constant offset value (model data 
minus inventory data, green), and harmonised model land use CO2 emissions (red, i.e. blue 
minus green). These harmonised land use CO2 emissions are then added to the 
unharmonised greenhouse gas emissions excluding land use CO2, to generate total 
greenhouse gas emission pathways including land use CO2. 
 
The shift in LULUCF CO2 emissions explored here leads, on average, to projected phase-out 
dates for greenhouse gases and CO2 that are approximately 5 to 15 years earlier, as 2010 
emission levels as calculated by models are generally higher than those from officially 
reported emissions data. Harmonising the model projections towards the countries’ land use 
emissions estimates results in net zero or negative emissions being achieved sooner, as 
illustrated in Table S.1 for some selected countries. The shift especially affects projected 
phase-out years for countries where LULUCF emissions play an important role (e.g. China, 
the EU and the United States, with reported carbon sinks). At the same time, also 
uncertainty still plays a large role. The linear shift also leads to a convergence of the phase-
out years for OECD countries, including the EU as a group, to around 2050–2070, which is 
earlier than for most of the non-OECD countries. Low-income countries, such as India, have 
projected phase-out years at the end of the century.  
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Table S.1. Projected regional phase-out years (median estimates) for greenhouse 
gas emissions (columns 1 and 2) or CO2 emissions only (columns 3 and 4), under 
delayed mitigation scenarios3 (cost-optimal allocation of reductions implemented 
after 2020), without harmonisation (columns 1 and 3) and with harmonisation to 
CO2 emissions from LULUCF (columns 2 and 4).  
 Phase-out year for all 
greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Phase-out year for all CO2 
emissions 
Phase-out 
year relative 
to World 
Country/ 
region [no. 
of models] 
No 
harmoni-
sation 
Harmoni-
sation of 
CO2 
emissions 
from 
LULUCF 
No 
Harmonisation 
Harmonisation 
of CO2 
emissions 
from LULUCF 
No 
harmonisation 
China [4] 2100 2090 2075 2070 Same 
EU [3] No phase-
out 
2080 2080 2060 Later 
India [3] No phase-
out 
No phase-
out 
2090 2080 Later 
Japan [2] 2065 2065 2055 2060 Earlier 
Russia [2] 2085 2075 2080 2055 Earlier 
United 
States [4] 
2065 2060 2060 2045 Earlier 
World [4] 2100 - 2065 - -  
Only regions that are covered by at least two models are shown here. See Appendix IV for 
indicative results on other regions. Years should be interpreted with care, as models 
generally report their emission projections in 10-year time steps. 
What are the regional emission reductions by 2030 and 2050 resulting from the 
greenhouse gas emission pathways that meet 2 °C with a likely chance? 
Scenarios that start cost-optimal mitigation in 2020 and meet 2 °C with a likely chance show 
median emission reductions of 12% by 2030 and 59% by 2050 for China, 36% by 2030 and 
74% by 2050 for the EU, 32% by 2030 and 85% by 2050 for the USA, and an increase of 
45% by 2030 followed by a reduction of 16% by 2050 for India, relative to 2010 and 
including LULUCF CO2. For the EU, this means reductions of 47% by 2030 and 80% by 2050, 
relative to 1990 (including LULUCF CO2). Achieving the aspirational 1.5 °C target would 
further increase the reduction targets for all countries. Various studies have calculated 
emission allowances by applying different equity principles to global emissions pathways 
consistent with achieving 2 °C or 1.5 °C. These studies show larger reductions targets for 
OECD countries, including those in the EU. 
 
What does greenhouse gas emissions neutrality mean, with respect to national CO2 
and non-CO2 emissions?  
Countries with early phase-out generally have a relatively large potential for negative 
emissions and relatively low emission levels of both CO2 (from the transport, industry and 
building sectors) and non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Contrasting the OECD90+EU region to the 
Latin America region shows relatively larger remaining F-gas and transport CO2 emissions in 
OECD countries, while Latin American countries show a relatively larger contribution from 
land use to negative emissions, albeit relatively large remaining CH4 emissions due to 
agricultural production. High potential for negative emissions from reforestation and 
                                               
3 This subset of mitigation scenarios (called delayed mitigation scenarios in this report) consists of scenarios 
that have a likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit, have modest emission reductions up to 2020, assume 
country pledges are fully implemented by 2020, and assume cost-optimal mitigation afterwards in order to 
achieve the 2 °C target. 
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increased managed forest area is related to low land costs and high forest growth rates in 
Latin America. 
When would global greenhouse gas emissions need to reach net zero, under 1.5 °C 
scenarios? 
To limit global warming to 1.5 °C, emissions need to peak earlier and be reduced faster and 
deeper compared to 2 °C pathways. Global greenhouse gas emissions would need to reach 
net zero between 2050 and 2070, for a medium to likely chance of achieving the 1.5 °C 
target. 
What would be the land-use implications of achieving 
greenhouse gas emissions neutrality? 
What would be the general land-use implications related to the 2 °C scenarios? 
According to integrated assessment models (here, IMAGE, MESSAGE-GLOBIOM, AIM/CGE, 
GCAM4, REMIND-MAGPIE), the dynamics of agricultural production are expected to be 
affected by land-demanding mitigation options, such as afforestation, avoided deforestation, 
improved agricultural management and bioenergy crop production. Dedicated energy crops 
are expected to play a critical role in 2 oC scenarios. The global area of land dedicated to 
energy crops, however, varies significantly across IAMs. The 2 °C scenarios project that, by 
2100, between 180 million ha (IMAGE) and 1084 million ha (GCAM) are expected to be 
allocated to energy crops—compared to currently less than one million ha. 
How do these strategies impact the forest area? 
The forest area is a function of possible reforestation/afforestation actions, on the one hand, 
and possible deforestation resulting from bio-energy production. On average, most models 
see a reduction of deforestation rates. The net loss of forest land would need to be halted by 
2030 and change to an increase in forest area thereafter. The projected increase in forest 
area varies significantly between IAMs. The increase in global forest area ranges from a 
moderate 150 million ha (REMIND-MAGPIE), to a significant 820 million ha (AIM/CGE) for the 
year 2100, compared to the situation of 2010.  
What could be consequences of these land-use related strategies?  
As shown in other publications, additional land-use for mitigation has impacts on food prices 
and biodiversity. However, food availability and agricultural commodity prices may differ 
significantly, depending on how mitigation policies are implemented and which sectors are 
specifically targeted by a policy measure. Similar uncertainty also holds for biodiversity. 
Some models project that under the baseline scenario, developments may lead to the 
conversion of a significant number of high biodiversity areas (220 million ha, globally, over 
the period from 2010 to 2050). Staying at or below the 2 °C temperature increase may have 
a relatively limited negative impact on the conversion of high biodiversity areas, and may 
only lead to an additional 20 million ha of high biodiversity areas being converted, globally, 
by 2050. 
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1.Background and 
objectives 
 
In December 2015, at the climate summit in Paris, Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). 
Parties agreed to keep the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 °C above 
pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit temperature rise further to 1.5 °C (Article 
2 of the Paris Agreement). In order to achieve these long-term temperature goals, Parties 
further agreed to ‘reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible […] 
and […] to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century.’ (UNFCCC, 2015) 
 
This balance between greenhouse gas emission sources and sinks, in essence, means 
reaching greenhouse gas (GHG4) emissions neutrality. In the literature, the term ‘climate 
neutrality’ is also used instead of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality (with a more or less 
similar meaning), but the latter is more specific than the former. The advantage is that it 
specifically indicates that neutrality refers to the sum of greenhouse gas emissions (thus 
excluding climate forcers such as aerosols and changes in albedo, also through 
geoengineering options such as solar radiation management and cloud seeding). That is why 
we opted for greenhouse gas emissions neutrality.  
 
The issue of greenhouse gas neutrality as indicated in the Paris Agreement is increasingly 
gaining interest among policymakers. However, key questions need to be addressed before 
the concept could be used. This publication discusses some of the relevant questions related 
to this concept. It includes an overview of the literature and of Integrated Assessment Model 
(IAM) runs and identifies knowledge gaps. The study focuses on the following three 
overarching policy questions:  
 
1. What are the main principles of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality—and what key 
open questions are related to this concept? 
2. What could be the global and regional implications of the emission pathways towards 
achieving greenhouse gas emissions neutrality? 
3. What are the land-use implications of achieving greenhouse gas emissions 
neutrality? 
 
Chapter 2 defines some key concepts, Chapter 3 deals with greenhouse gas emissions 
pathways implications of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality, Chapter 4 gives an overview 
of negative emissions options, and Chapter 5 zooms in on some of those options and their 
implications for the land-use sector.  
                                               
4 GWP-aggregated emissions of all Kyoto greenhouse gases. In the remainder of the report, emissions include 
CO2 from LULUCF, unless indicated otherwise. 
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2.Main principles of 
greenhouse gas 
emissions neutrality 
and open questions  
What is meant by ‘greenhouse gas emissions neutrality’ 
and ‘carbon neutrality’?  
The following definitions are used in this report (Höhne et al., 2015): 
- ‘‘Climate neutrality’ on the global scale is equivalent to the net phase out of all 
greenhouse gas emissions.’ 
-  ‘’Carbon neutrality’ is a very similar concept, but for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
only’. 
 
In the remainder of this report, we will refer to greenhouse gas emissions neutrality rather 
than climate neutrality for clarity, because climate neutrality is not clearly defined, possibly 
leading to different interpretations. For example, climate neutrality could be interpreted to 
relate to radiative forcing, i.e. allowing for geoengineering approaches other than those that 
affect greenhouse gases, such as solar radiation management. As our focus is on greenhouse 
gas emissions, ‘greenhouse gas emissions neutrality’ seemed a more appropriate term, 
referring to the moment that the sum of all greenhouse gas (Kyoto gas) emissions reaches 
zero. 
 
The World Resources Institute (WRI) (Levin et al., 2015a) offers a glossary of terms related 
to the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement. It defines carbon neutrality as ‘annual zero net 
anthropogenic (human-induced or influenced) CO2 emissions by a certain date’. In Levin et 
al. (2015b), the concept of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality is explained in detail, as this 
concept was introduced in the draft Paris Agreement at that time: ‘Greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions neutrality should be interpreted to mean net zero anthropogenic GHG emissions 
from all sectors. It is achieved first and foremost by reducing total GHG emissions to as close 
to zero as possible. Any remaining GHGs would be balanced with an equivalent amount of 
removals (such as enhanced sequestration in the land sector) or negative emissions 
(possibly using future technologies like bioenergy combined with carbon capture and 
sequestration’. Summarising, greenhouse gas emissions neutrality is the same concept as 
carbon neutrality, but rather than only focusing on CO2 emissions, it includes net zero 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
It should be noted that greenhouse gas emissions neutrality is defined by a sum of different 
emission categories, including energy-system CO2 emissions, land-use related CO2 emissions 
and non-CO2 emissions. Some of the emissions are difficult to reduce. They can be 
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compensated, however, by so-called negative emissions, i.e. CO2 removal from the 
atmosphere. This can be done in different ways, including through the combination of bio-
energy and CCS (BECCS), afforestation/reforestation, enhanced weathering and additional 
storage of carbon in soils. The combination of these different sources and sinks can lead to 
“greenhouse gas emissions neutrality”, i.e., net zero emissions.  
 
Rogelj et al. (2015b) provide a scientific clarification of zero-emission concepts (see their 
Table 1). They define carbon neutrality as total annual CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic 
sources being net zero, on a global level. In their definition, carbon neutrality is a synonym 
for the scientific term ‘net zero carbon emissions’. Similarly, climate neutrality corresponds 
to net zero greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
Both Levin et al. (2015b) and Butler et al. (2015) note that greenhouse gas emissions and 
carbon neutrality can also be applied on a smaller scale, relating to ‘activities of an 
individual, an organisation, a city or a country’. On that level, emission credits from offset 
mechanisms could be used to achieve neutrality. 
 
Both greenhouse gas emissions neutrality and carbon neutrality link to the scientific 
understanding that global greenhouse gas emissions need to be brought to net zero to 
stabilise global temperatures (Evans and Pidcock, 2015). Neither of the terms ended up in 
the Paris Agreement, but they were considered during the negotiations (Evans and Pidcock, 
2015). The final wording of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) in relation to the long-term 
goal (Evans, 2015) is (emphasis added):  
 
‘In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties aim 
to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognising 
that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid 
reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a 
balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, 
and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty’.  
 
The Paris Agreement framing of its long-term goal is most similar to greenhouse gas 
emissions neutrality.  
What are key open questions related to the concept of 
greenhouse gas emissions neutrality? 
There are different ways to define greenhouse gas emissions neutrality. As the concept of 
greenhouse gas emissions neutrality is defined as the sum of greenhouse gas emissions 
being zero, it directly depends on the use of metrics that equate the contribution of different 
greenhouse gases. The use of 20, 100 or 200-year global warming potentials (GWPs) or 
other equivalence metrics directly defines the moment in time “greenhouse gas emissions 
neutrality” is reached (see section 3.1.1). This is also true for the way land-use related 
emissions are accounted for. 
 
There is large uncertainty in land-use related CO2 emissions, while also different definitions 
are used (see section 3.3 and Appendix IV). Land-use related CO2 emissions are very 
uncertain and researchers use different methods to estimate the emissions. It should also be 
noted that there are different ways to distinguish between natural and anthropogenic land-
use related CO2 emissions. In models, usually land-use related emissions are defined on the 
basis of land-use change. In contrast, in the reporting of most countries under UNFCCC, all 
changes in CO2 stocks in managed forests are counted as anthropogenic. This thus includes 
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the removal of additional CO2 from the atmosphere by existing forests, which is accounted 
for as a natural CO2 flow in most models. These definitions have a relatively small impact on 
total CO2 emissions right now, but can strongly influence the overall emissions once other 
sources are reduced to near-zero (and thus the year greenhouse gas emissions neutrality is 
reached). 
 
Further discussion on how to account for negative emissions is needed. A key source of 
possible negative emissions is BECCS. In BECCS application, the CO2 removal physically 
takes place during biomass production (‘at the field’). In accordance with the concept of 
accounting for ‘normal’ CO2 emissions at the place of combustion, most models also assign 
negative emissions to the regions where combustion takes place. Clearly, how to properly 
assign negative emissions still needs to be discussed further (see section 3.3). The year of 
greenhouse gas emissions neutrality of different regions strongly depends on these 
accounting tools. 
 
While the concept of greenhouse gas emissions neutrality provides an attractive formulation 
of long-term ambition of different countries, further discussion is needed on how to best 
define this concept. Above, we discussed several issues that strongly impact results. Further 
discussion on how to best deal with these issues is needed. In the remainder of this 
publication, we illustrate possible outcomes, also in light of these uncertainties. 
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3.Global and regional 
implications of 
emission pathways 
towards greenhouse 
gas emissions 
neutrality  
3.1 When would global greenhouse gas emissions need to 
reach net zero, under 2 °C scenarios? 
The form of the emission profile strongly depends on societal choices regarding 
overshoot and timing and the availability of different technologies. The AR5 report 
indicates, using the full set of scenarios available at the time, that global 
greenhouse gas emissions would need to reach net zero between 2080 and 2100, 
in order to stay within the 2 °C limit with a 66% probability. This conclusion, 
however, depends on the assumed negative emissions and the possible overshoot. 
In any case, CO2 emissions would need to reach zero earlier. In optimal scenarios 
this happens between 2055 and 2070, but this depends on the assumed starting 
date of cost-optimal reductions that are to achieve this goal.  
 
In addition to the temperature target (e.g. 1.5–2 °C), the preferred likelihood of reaching the 
target and the assumed starting date of cost-optimal emission reductions (3.1.1), and the 
role of negative emissions (3.1.2) also matter. Figure 1 shows typical pathways in line with 2 
°C, reaching greenhouse gas emissions neutrality by the end of the century. 
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Figure 1. Pathways of global greenhouse gas emissions (GtCO2eq/year) in 1.5 °C 
scenarios of the IMAGE integrated assessment model.  
 
 
Source: This study, based on Van Vuuren et al. (2018)  
3.1.1 Literature review: The impact of the likelihood and the assumed start 
date of cost-optimal emission reductions on reaching the temperature 
target 
 
Höhne et al. (2015) summarised the projected timing of net zero greenhouse gas emissions 
for reaching 2 °C with various likelihoods (Table 1). Their analysis was based on scenarios 
that assume emission reductions start immediately (2010), and distribute reductions cost-
optimally over time. Main findings are: 
 For a likely chance (more than 66%) of achieving the 2 °C target (IPCC category 430–
480 ppm CO2 equivalents), global emissions of all greenhouse gases need to be net 
zero by 2100. The global CO2 emissions will reach net zero by 2070 (30 years earlier). 
Most scenarios assume that it is more difficult to reduce emissions of N2O and CH4 
from agriculture to zero. Therefore, negative CO2 emissions are needed to reach net 
zero greenhouse gas emissions.  
 For a medium chance (33%–66%) of achieving the 2 °C target, the timing of net zero 
emissions is approximately five years later. The emission reductions early on are lower. 
Table 1. Summary of timing of reaching net zero greenhouse gas and CO2 
emissions, and emission reductions by 2030 and 2050, for cost-optimal pathways 
(starting in 2010).  
 Net zero 
year 
Change in GHG emissions relative to 20101 levels 
Chance of 
staying below 
2 °C by 2100 
All 
GHG 
CO2 2030 2050 2100 
Likely chance 
(>66%) 
2100 2070 [-40%;5%] [-45%; -65%] [-118%;-78%] 
Medium chance 
(33%–66%) 
2100 2075 [-30%;20%] [-40%;-60%] [-73%;-21%] 
1 For comparison to 1990 levels: GHG emissions have increased from 38 GtCO2eq in 1990 to 
51 GtCO2eq in 2010 (EDGAR database, JRC/PBL, 2014). 
Source: Höhne et al. (2015) 
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Rogelj et al. (2015b) and Schleussner et al. (2016) did a similar analysis with these 
scenarios, but focused on the mitigation scenarios that account for the implementation of the 
2020 pledges. They found that the pledges for 2020 would imply that global total CO2 
emissions need to reach net zero between 2060 and 2070 for a likely (>66%) chance of 
staying below 2 °C, i.e. somewhat earlier than under scenarios starting cost-optimal 
mitigation in 2010, with net negative CO2 emissions thereafter (Figure 2). Because of 
residual non-CO2 emissions, net zero is always reached later for total greenhouse gas 
emissions than for CO2. The emissions can be phased out later for lower likelihoods of 
achieving the target. Only a limited number of model scenarios were available for a target of 
1.5 °C with a >50% chance in Rogelj et al. (2015b) and Schleussner et al. (2016), and these 
assume relatively high global emissions by 2020, compared to the larger set of model 
scenarios that have pathways towards 2 °C with a >66% chance (compare blue area with 
brown area in Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Characteristics of 1.5 °C and 2 °C scenarios  
 
The colours in panel b correspond to the colours in panel a. Source: Schleussner et al. 
(2016) (see also Rogelj et al. (2015b) for a similar figure). 
 
UNEP (2014) has analysed the impact of starting cost-optimal emission reductions in 2020 
instead of 2010, based on a scenario assessment. Their analysis showed that the higher the 
net global emissions in the near term, the higher the required level of negative emissions in 
the second half of the century, and the earlier the timing of reaching net zero emissions. For 
2 °C scenarios starting cost-optimal mitigation in 2020, global greenhouse gas emissions are 
projected to reach net zero by 2085 (2080–2100), and CO2 emissions by 2070 (2060–2075) 
(Table 2). This is about 20 years (all greenhouse gases) and five years (CO2) earlier, 
compared to under the least-cost 2010 scenarios. However, taking 2010–2012 as the 
beginning of the cost-optimal mitigation period is not realistic, given historical trends in 
greenhouse gas emissions and the current status of international climate policy. UNEP 
(2016), therefore, does not extensively discuss these scenarios, but instead focuses on the 
delayed mitigation pathways. Two main reasons for this choice of focus were: 1) actual 
emissions since 2010 have been higher than under 2 oC scenarios with a least-cost pathway 
beginning in 2010 (rather than 2020); 2) least-cost delayed (2020) mitigation scenarios 
seem to be more in line with current policies projections of 2020 emissions. 
 
Studies comparing cost-optimal and delayed mitigation pathways generally conclude that 
delay implies more rapid and deeper decarbonisation after 2030. Such delayed mitigation 
pathways may still phase-out global greenhouse gas emissions by the end of the century 
(Kriegler et al., 2014b; Kriegler et al., 2014c), but the compensation for the delay is mainly 
concentrated during the 2030–2050 period (Kriegler et al., 2014b). This period shows 
historically unprecedented emission reduction rates, rapid scale-up of low-carbon energy 
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technologies and early retirement of carbon-intensive infrastructure (Kriegler et al., 2014b). 
In addition, delaying cost-optimal mitigation until 2030 implies an increased reliance on the 
availability of specific technologies such as CCS and (large-scale use of) bioenergy to achieve 
the agreed climate target (Riahi et al., 2015). For example, the low-carbon share in primary 
energy (including fossil fuels that are used in combination with CCS) is projected to increase 
between 2030 and 2050, by 170% in one delay scenario and by 320% in another, while the 
cost-optimal scenario (reductions from 2010 onwards) shows an increase of approximately 
100%, over the same time period. 
Put differently, when assuming delay until 2030 as well as unavailability of CCS, only a 
limited number of model runs find a feasible solution for the 450 ppm CO2eq5 target (Riahi et 
al., 2015). The 2 °C pathways in Kriegler et al. (2014c), which delay action until 2020, also 
all use negative emissions. Van Vuuren et al. (2015) and Riahi et al. (2015) summarise a few 
additional challenges related with delaying global mitigation action: reduced flexibility, lock-
in, increased costs, and increased climate risks. UNEP (2016) summarised the implications of 
delaying mitigation as follows: higher emission reduction rates in the medium to long term, 
less options for stringent reductions available, more lock-in of carbon-intensive 
infrastructure, greater dependence on negative emissions in the medium to long term, 
higher mitigation costs, and larger risk of not achieving the 2 °C target (let alone 1.5 °C).  
 
Kriegler et al. (2014a) analysed a different form of delay, looking at so-called staged 
accession scenarios. In these scenarios, only the EU or the EU and China start early 
mitigation consistent with achieving 2 °C, and the rest of the world follows between 2030 
and 2050. Although these scenarios are unlikely to be consistent with achieving 2 °C (higher 
probability of exceeding the target), they reduce global warming by 2100 by over 1°C 
compared to a reference scenario. 
 
Table 2. Summary of timing of reaching net zero CO2 and greenhouse gas 
emissions, and emission reductions by 2030 and 2050, for delayed mitigation 
pathways (starting in 2020). 
 Net zero GHG emissions 
year1) 
Change in GHG emissions relative to 20102) 
levels (top row) / 1990 levels (bottom row) 
 All GHG CO2 2030 2050 21001) 
Likely 
chance of 
staying 
below 2 
°C by 
2100 
(>66%) 
2085 
[2080;2100] 
2070 
[2060;2075] 
[-39%;-10%]/ 
[-19%; 19%] 
[-49%;-63%]/ 
[-32%;-51%] 
[-120%;-100%]/ 
[-127%;-100%] 
1) Rounded to the nearest 5 years. Format: median [20th percentile ; 80th percentile] 
2) Not provided directly by UNEP (2014), but inferred from Table 2.2 using 49 GtCO2eq as the 
2010 emission level. Range format: [20th percentile ; 80th percentile] 
Source: UNEP (2015); UNEP (2014). 
 
In addition to likelihood and start date of cost-optimal mitigation, the metric used to 
aggregate greenhouse gas emissions to CO2-equivalent emissions—for example Global 
Warming Potential (GWP) or Global Temperature change Potential (GTP)— also matters. This 
issue is not further explored here, but Fuglestvedt et al. (2018) show the impact of different 
metrics and time horizons on timing of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions (their Figure 2c). 
They show a shift in the timing by only a few years moving from GWPs from the IPCC’s 
second assessment report (SAR) to the fourth (AR4) or fifth (AR5) assessment report, but up 
                                               
5 Central value within the 430–480 ppm CO2eq forcing category of IPCC Fifth Assessment report (Clarke et al., 
2014) 
  
 PBL | 21 
to 20 years earlier phase-out when moving from GWPs to GTPs. Here we use the CO2-
equivalent emissions based on GWPs from AR4 (time horizon of 100 years). The text of the 
Paris Agreement leaves the choice of metric open, and refers to the common metrics 
assessed by the IPCC, which are mainly the GWPs. 
3.1.2 Literature review: The impact of negative emissions 
In most 2 °C scenarios, after reaching net zero greenhouse gas emissions globally, negative 
emissions are achieved in the second half of the century by the use of so-called negative 
emissions technologies (see Chapter 4 for an overview). Such negative emissions might be 
achieved on a large scale, for example, by massive afforestation or reforestation, and/or by 
combining bioenergy with capture and geological storage of CO2 (BECCS). Bioenergy 
combined with CCS has been studied increasingly over the past decade, but uncertainties 
about its large-scale deployment remain, considering a number of critical barriers (e.g. Fuss 
et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2016). 
 
Van Vuuren et al. (2015) showed that the use of negative emissions technologies may 
distinguish pathways (Figure 3). However, far more scenarios with negative emissions are 
available than scenarios without negative emissions. Generally, excluding the option of 
negative emissions means both CO2 and total greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced 
more strongly. Cost-optimal (2010) scenarios without negative CO2 emissions show global 
greenhouse gas emission reductions of at least 60% to 70% by 2050, and CO2 emission 
reductions of 65% to 95% by 2050, compared to 2010 (Van Vuuren et al., 2015). The IPCC’s 
Fifth Assessment Report further shows that scenarios with more net negative emissions 
(over 20 GtCO2 per year) generally show later and higher greenhouse gas emission peaks, 
but earlier phase-out years, compared to scenarios with negative emissions below 20 GtCO2 
per year (Edenhofer et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 3. Emission pathways for 2 °C, distinguished by the use of negative 
emissions. 
 
Source: Van Vuuren et al. (2015) 
 
UNEP (2014) also showed that only a small set of scenarios is able to limit warming to below 
2 °C without achieving net negative emissions by 2100. However, these scenarios all start 
stringent, global mitigation before 2020, as also shown in Figure 3, which is no longer 
considered realistic. Therefore, Riahi et al. (2015) studied scenarios that delay action until 
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2030, and found that models with large potential for negative emissions could compensate 
for the delay, keeping the 2 °C target within reach, albeit with higher probability to exceed 
the target. Limiting or excluding options such as BECCS would make it difficult or even 
impossible to limit global warming to levels lower than 2 °C. Without exception, all 1.5 °C 
scenarios available in the literature achieve net negative CO2 emissions by mid-century, even 
under stringent mitigation action having started in 2010 (UNEP, 2016). A ‘carbon law’ 
presented by Rockström et al. (2017) proposes to halve anthropogenic CO2 emissions every 
decade, leading to net zero CO2 emissions around 2050. This would limit warming to below 2 
°C with 66% probability and to below 1.5 °C with 50% probability. In this trajectory, 
negative emissions through BECCS and LULUCF contribute approximately -20 GtCO2eq by 
2100. Generally, Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) scenarios project negative emissions of 
10–20 GtCO2eq per year in the second half of the century (see also Sections 3.2 and 4.3).  
3.1.3 Additional analysis – LIMITS and AMPERE 
The additional analysis presented here uses data from the LIMITS and AMPERE projects 
(Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015), which were international cooperation projects. 
The IAMs covered by these studies are DNE21+, GCAM, GEM-E3, IMAGE, MESSAGE-
GLOBIOM, POLES, REMIND-MAGPIE and WITCH.  
 
Box 1. Methodology and scenario characteristics 
 
For this analysis, published 450 ppm CO2eq mitigation scenarios were used, in which cost-
optimal mitigation starts in 2020 (used as default here; presented as ‘Delayed 450’) or 2030 
(presented as ‘Delayed 450_2030’), which is considered more realistic than scenarios 
implementing cost-optimal mitigation from 2010 or 2012.  
 
450 ppm CO2eq was chosen as it is broadly consistent with a likely (more than 66%) chance 
to limit global warming to 2 °C. The scenarios that delay cost-optimal mitigation to 2020 
(used as default here) have a 66% chance of achieving the 2 °C target (median across four 
models), but the scenarios that delay cost-optimal mitigation to 2030 only have a 60% 
chance (median across three models), see Table 3. 
 
Furthermore, scenarios with full technology availability were selected, i.e. no limitations on 
the use of biomass, CCS, or nuclear, as the effect of technology limitation is not the main 
question here. Finally, only scenarios with projections until 2100 were used, needed for 
calculations of phase-out and peak years, but also for calculations of 2030 and 2050 
reduction targets consistent with the Paris Agreement long-term goals. For comparison, 
however, see Appendix III for reduction targets calculated with the set including projections 
ending in 2050 (POLES and DNE21+, and GEM-E3 with projections up to 2030).  
 
Specifically, the following scenarios remained after this selection: AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
HST/LST, LIMITS-RefPol-450 and variants –EE and –PC, and LIMITS-StrPol-450. The 
AMPERE3-450 scenario was not used as it starts cost-optimal mitigation in 2012 (i.e. it is not 
in the delayed mitigation towards 450 ppm CO2eq category). EMF27-450 scenarios were 
omitted for the same reason. To avoid double counting, only the LIMITS-RefPol-450 scenario 
was selected in the ‘Delayed 2020’ category (LIMITS-StrPol-450 is very similar in terms of 
carbon budgets, temperature change and exceedance probability), while the AMPERE2 
scenarios from the ‘Delayed 2030’ category are shown for comparison. For the POLES model, 
the scenario results of the GECO 2016 report were used (hereafter referred to as POLES 
GECO2016), which were only available for the time period 2005-2050 (Kitous et al., 2016). 
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In addition to selecting scenarios, a few constraints were applied. To filter out different 
region definitions than EU28 (i.e. Europe in a broader sense, which is not representative for 
the EU acting as a Party in climate negotiations), projections with 2010 emissions above 
1000 Mt CO2 for the EU were removed. Furthermore, India and EU projections from the 
MESSAGE model were removed, as the model has a larger South Asia region and an EU 
region including Turkey. In cases models reported multiple scenarios within the 2030 delayed 
mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq category, the mean was taken per model. The GCAM model was 
excluded as it had a lower probability of achieving the 2 °C objective and higher potential for 
negative emissions than other models (Riahi et al., 2015). See Appendix I for an overview of 
remaining models, scenarios and regions covered, and Appendix II for the region definitions. 
 
Note that the 2 °C target was implemented as a radiative forcing target (2.8 W/m2) in 
LIMITS, which induces a price on the controlled emissions (all greenhouse gases and other 
anthropogenic forcing agents), meaning that models had flexibility as to where emission 
reductions occur to ensure lowest marginal abatement costs. Only Kyoto emissions were 
priced by most models, while non-Kyoto forcing agents were uncontrolled (Kriegler et al., 
2014c). In AMPERE, the target was implemented as a long-term cumulative CO2 emissions 
budget (1500 Gt CO2 for 2000-2100, with different numbers for models that do not include 
land use emissions or have a time horizon to 2050). Models were instructed to apply the 
resulting CO2 price also to non-CO2 greenhouse gases (Riahi et al., 2015).  
 
Table 3: Scenario characteristics of the scenarios used here (Kriegler et al., 
2014a,c; Riahi et al., 2015;Tavoni et al., 2014) 
Scenario Delay 
until 
Cumulative 
emissions 
(2010 – 
2100) 
CO2e 
concentrations 
(2100) 
Probability of 
achieving 2°C 
(max) 
Temperature 
change (max) 
LIMITS-
RefPol-450 
2020 700 – 1260 
GtCO2 
(fossil fuel 
and industry 
CO2) 
1730 – 
2160 
GtCO2e 
(Kyoto gas) 
450-480 ppm Around 2/3 (59 
– 76%; IMAGE 
70%, MESSAGE 
60%, REMIND 
80%) 
1.7 – 1.9 °C 
AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-HST 
2030 1344 (1274 
– 1382) 
GtCO2 
(2005-
2100) 
484 (452 – 520) 
ppm 
Median across 
three models* 
53% (full range 
including GCAM 
16% - 72%; 
MESSAGE 53%, 
REMIND 61%, 
WITCH 68%) 
2.0 (1.6 – 2.5) 
°C 
AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-LST 
2030 1335 (1263 
– 1379) 
GtCO2 
(2005-
2100) 
488 (455 – 524) 
ppm 
Median across 
three models* 
55% (full range 
16% - 72%; 
MESSAGE 50%, 
REMIND 61%, 
WITCH 68%) 
2.0 (1.5 – 2.5) 
°C 
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* IMAGE scenarios for AMPERE2-450-FullTech-HST and AMPERE2-450-FullTech-LST were not 
technically feasible. 
 
Globally, CO2 emissions are projected to reach net zero between 2060 and 2080, under 
delayed (2020) mitigation scenarios targeting 450 ppm CO2eq (assumed to be consistent 
with a 66% chance of staying below 2 °C), and by 2070 under delayed (2030) mitigation 
scenarios (consistent with 55% chance of staying below 2 °C), according to results from the 
LIMITS and AMPERE scenario databases (based on four models with projections until 2100 
and full data coverage: IMAGE, MESSAGE-GLOBIOM, REMIND-MAGPIE, WITCH). Greenhouse 
gas emissions, in contrast, are projected to reach net zero after 2090 under delayed (2020) 
mitigation scenarios and by 2100 under delayed (2030) mitigation scenarios, or show no 
phase-out at all. Greenhouse gas and CO2 emissions, however, are projected to peak by 
2020 under the delayed (2020) mitigation scenarios and by 2030 under the delayed (2030) 
mitigation scenarios (Figure 10). All of these scenarios assume no limitation of technologies, 
and all of them apply negative emissions, mostly in the energy system.  
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Box 2. What are the net global emission reductions by 2030 and 2050 
corresponding to greenhouse gas emissions neutrality? 
 
Table 4, Table 5 and Figure 4 present an overview of the global greenhouse gas and CO2 
emission reductions (including and excluding LULUCF CO2) by 2030 and 2050 for scenarios 
having a likely (>66%) chance of limiting global temperature increase to 2 °C during the 
21st century. The net global greenhouse gas emissions projections for the world for the full 
technology6 cases of the delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios from the AMPERE and 
LIMITS databases were used, in particular the median estimate over the various model 
studies with projections until 2100 (see Table 12 in Appendix III for reductions using the full 
set of models). More specifically: Delayed mitigation pathways towards 450 ppm CO2eq, i.e. 
limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards in order to achieve a CO2-
equivalent concentration level of 450 ppm by 2100.  
 
Table 4: Projected global greenhouse gas emissions (including LULUCF CO2) by 
2030 and 2050, relative to 2010, in delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios 
(negative numbers denote a reduction). 
 2030 2050 
Delayed (2020) % % 
Mean [min; max] -18 [-39; -7] -58 [-65; -47] 
Median [10th percentile; 90th 
percentile] 
-13 [-32; -9] -59 [-63; -51] 
Delayed (2030) % % 
Mean [min; max] 13 [12; 15] -52 [-61; -43] 
Median [10th percentile; 90th 
percentile] 
14 [12; 15] -51 [-59; -45] 
For comparison to 1990 levels: GHG emissions have increased from 38 GtCO2eq in 1990 to 
51 GtCO2eq in 2010 (EDGAR database, JRC/PBL, 2014). 
Source: LIMITS and AMPERE databases (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015) 
 
  
                                               
6 The full portfolio of technologies is available and may scale up successfully to meet the concentration target. 
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Figure 4: Projected global greenhouse gas emissions (upper: including LULUCF CO2, 
lower: excluding LULUCF CO2) by 2030 and 2050, relative to 2010, in delayed 
mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios (left: 2020, right: 2030).  
 
 
Negative numbers denote a reduction. Bar: median, error bar: 10th – 90th percentiles. 
 
Table 5: Projected global CO2 emissions (including LULUCF CO2) by 2030 and 2050, 
relative to 2010, in delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios (negative 
numbers denote a reduction).  
 2030 2050 
Delayed (2020) % % 
Mean [min; max] -22 [-47; -8] -76 [-84; -62] 
Median [10th percentile; 90th 
percentile] 
-17 [-39; -10] -80 [-83; -66] 
Delayed (2030) % % 
Mean [min; max] 16 [14; 21] -69 [-80; -62] 
Median [10th percentile; 90th 
percentile] 
15 [14; 20] -64 [-77; -62] 
For comparison to 1990 levels: CO2 emissions have increased from 22 GtCO2 in 1990 to 34 
GtCO2 in 2010 (EDGAR database, JRC/PBL, 2014). 
Source: LIMITS and AMPERE databases (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015) 
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3.2 What does greenhouse gas emissions neutrality 
mean, with respect to global CO2 and non-CO2 
emissions? 
Greenhouse gas emissions neutrality does not imply full decarbonisation, as the 
remaining emissions of CO2 in the transport, industry and building sectors, and of 
non-CO2 greenhouse gases, mostly in agriculture, can be compensated for by 
negative emissions from LULUCF sinks (mainly forests) and through the use of 
biomass in energy production coupled with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS). 
 
Three major categories of mitigation actions can be identified for achieving net zero 
greenhouse gas emissions (Government of the United States, 2016): 
 
1. Decarbonising the energy system, by decarbonising electricity and using low-carbon 
fuels in transportation, buildings, and industry; 
2. Reducing non-CO2 emissions (CH4, N2O and F gases), which come from fossil fuel 
production, agriculture, waste, and refrigerants; and 
3. Sequestering carbon, by increasing carbon stocks on land (forests and soils) and by 
deploying technologies such as BECCS, which can result in negative emissions. 
 
This implies that extra efforts in one area (sector, greenhouse gas) can compensate for less 
action in another area, for example because of technical limitations.  
 
Approximately 900 mitigation scenarios from IAMs have been evaluated in the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report (Edenhofer et al., 2014). Main findings regarding the contributions of 
CO2, non-CO2 and negative emissions are as follows:  
1. For decarbonising the energy system, the share of low-carbon energy supply 
(renewables, nuclear energy, fossil energy with CCS and BECCS) triples to 
quadruples by 2050, relative to 2010, under scenarios reaching 450 to 500 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100. Luderer et al. (2017) found that wind and solar power are generally 
projected to contribute substantially to the decarbonisation of the power sector, 
accounting for over half of electricity supply in 2 °C-consistent scenarios. They 
further concluded that variable renewable energy sources would need higher shares 
in electricity supply if nuclear power or CCS are excluded. Options to decarbonise 
transport include using electric, hydrogen and fuel-cell light-duty vehicles, low-
carbon fuels, improving vehicle and engine performance, behavioural change (modal 
shift), investments in infrastructure, and avoiding journeys. In the building sector, 
net zero-energy buildings in both new constructions and retrofits and behavioural 
changes offer key mitigation options. For decarbonising industry, mitigation options 
beyond energy efficiency are needed, including recycling, product innovations and 
reducing service demand.  
2. Next to decarbonising the energy system, these scenarios see a critical role for 
mitigation within the land system. Next to afforestation and BECCS (category 3), 
agricultural productivity improvement plays a role. F-gas emissions could be reduced 
by the replacement of HFCs, recycling refrigerants, and repairing leaks in industry. 
3. Many scenarios that temporarily overshoot the target (e.g. 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100) 
rely heavily on BECCS and/or afforestation in the second half of the century.  
 
Figure 5 gives a breakdown of greenhouse gas emissions by the end of the century 
(scenarios from the LIMITS and AMPERE databases, with 4 models providing projections of 
greenhouse gas emissions up to 2100). For the delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios, 
MESSAGE-GLOBIOM and REMIND-MAGPIE project phase-out years for greenhouse gas 
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emissions around 2090, while the IMAGE and WITCH models project no phase-out during the 
21st century. Remaining emissions in the phase-out year, similar to those under the optimal 
and delayed mitigation scenarios, are projected to come from 1) the energy system (demand 
sectors transport, industry and, to a smaller extent, buildings) and 2) non-CO2 greenhouse 
gases (CH4, N2O, and F gases). All models show negative emissions (category 3) in energy 
supply, achieved through carbon capture and storage. They further show negative emissions 
in LULUCF (afforestation), although to various degrees (while MESSAGE-GLOBIOM realises a 
significant part of projected negative emissions through LULUCF—i.e. afforestation, REMIND-
MAGPIE has a stronger preference for BECCS, with much lower negative LULUCF emissions).  
 
Remaining CO2 emissions from transport vary more across models than other sectoral 
emissions. This relates to different ways the models project final energy demand in 
transportation to be met: while MESSAGE-GLOBIOM projects relatively large use of gases, 
IMAGE projects use of gases to be almost phased out. IMAGE further shows a stronger 
increase in hydrogen use than other models. IMAGE projects a strong decrease in the use of 
liquids (especially oil) and REMIND-MAGPIE also projects a decrease, while MESSAGE-
GLOBIOM shows more or less stable liquids use. As such, IMAGE decarbonises transport 
more than other models do. All models project further electrification of transport, with 
transport electricity demand increasing most in models that project larger total final energy 
use in transportation (MESSAGE-GLOBIOM, REMIND-MAGPIE). 
 
Figure 5. Breakdown of emissions (MtCO2eq) in 2100 (qualitatively similar to 
emissions in the phase-out year for greenhouse gas emissions), for delayed 
mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios.   
 
Positive numbers denote remaining emissions of CH4, N2O, F gases, and CO2 in industry 
(‘CO2industry’), buildings (‘CO2buildings’) and transport (‘CO2transport’), while negative 
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numbers denote negative emissions in energy supply7 (‘CO2supply’) and land use8 
(‘CO2land’). Note that REMIND-MAGPIE did not report CO2 emissions from the demand 
sectors (buildings, industry, agriculture), and none of the models reported CO2 emissions 
from agriculture. Source: PBL calculations are based on the LIMITS and AMPERE databases 
(Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015). 
  
                                               
7 ‘CO2supply’ includes ‘carbon dioxide emissions from power and heat generation, other energy conversion (e.g. 
refineries, synfuel production), resource extraction and energy transmission and distribution (e.g. gas 
pipelines)’. Negative emissions in this sector results from the use of (BE)CCS. 
8 ‘CO2land’ means ‘net carbon dioxide emissions from all categories of land use and land-use change (e.g., 
pasture conversion, deforestation, afforestation, reforestation, soil management, etc.)’ 
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3.3 When would national and regional greenhouse gas 
emissions need to reach net zero, under 2 °C 
scenarios?  
Regional projections of phase-out years depend strongly on how negative 
emissions achieved through BECCS are allocated: to the region producing the 
biomass, or to the region applying it with CCS? Using the latter definition 
(consistent with the IAM models), the earliest achievement of net zero greenhouse 
gas emissions occurs in 2060, and of net zero CO2 emissions in 2050, for some 
regions, while most regions are projected to reach net zero later, based on the 
analysis of model scenarios of the LIMITS and AMPERE projects. For regions with 
larger shares of non-CO2 emissions and/or less potential to create negative 
emissions, this moment occurs later in time. Differences in land-use accounting 
methods strongly affect the year greenhouse gas emissions neutrality is reached. 
As indicated earlier, uncertainty in land-use related CO2 emissions is large, while 
this is confounded by the different definitions that are used. The EU, China and the 
United States report carbon sinks for managed forests, which are projected to 
remain more or less the same in the future. Models, however, consider this to be a 
natural CO2 sink caused by carbon fertilisation. This discrepancy can be removed by 
harmonising definitions. It is possible to get some idea of the impact of this 
definition of ‘harmonisation’ by, in this case, adding the absolute emissions 
difference in 2010 between the inventory data and the model data to the model 
projections. This leads to shifting the absolute values of the emission projections 
up or down, without changing the trend. The shift in LULUCF CO2 emissions 
explored here leads, on average, to projected phase-out dates for greenhouse 
gases and CO2 that are approximately 5 to 15 years earlier, as 2010 emission levels 
as calculated by models are generally higher than those from officially reported 
emissions data. Harmonising the model projections towards the countries’ land use 
emissions estimates results in net zero or negative emissions being achieved 
sooner. The shift especially affects projected phase-out years for countries where 
LULUCF emissions play an important role (e.g. China, the EU and the United States, 
with reported carbon sinks). At the same time, also uncertainty still plays a large 
role. The linear shift also leads to a convergence of the phase-out years for OECD 
countries, including the EU as a group, to around 2050–2070, which is earlier than 
for most of the non-OECD countries. Low-income countries, such as India, have 
projected phase-out years at the end of the century.  
In the previous sections, phase-out years and contributions of different greenhouse gases 
were described at the global level. However, these may differ at the regional level, with 
some countries phasing out greenhouse gas emissions at an earlier point in time than other 
countries. 
 
The IAM scenarios discussed here assume globally cost-optimal emission reductions to reach 
2 °C, starting in 2010 (older literature), 2020, or 2030. As a result, these scenarios assume 
that emissions are reduced in the regions and sectors where they are cheapest to be 
reduced. This does not say anything on who pays for these emission reductions. Generally, 
these scenarios show earlier phase-out dates (by when emissions reach net zero) for 
countries with a large potential for emission reduction and/or negative emissions, in 
particular related to the potential of the land use sector to generate negative emissions, be it 
directly in the form of a sink, or indirectly through BECCS. For example, many models 
assume that avoiding deforestation and enhancing afforestation can be achieved at low 
prices and therefore assign early reductions to the Latin American region. In addition, 
regional projections of phase-out years depend strongly on how negative emissions achieved 
  
 PBL | 31 
through BECCS are allocated: to the region producing the biomass, or to the region applying 
it with CCS? In IAMs, the latter is generally used as definition, which we, therefore, also use 
here. Future research could explore the implications of different allocation rules for regional 
neutrality projections.  
 
Höhne et al. (2015) distinguished between a likely and a medium chance of achieving the 
2 °C target under cost-optimal (2010) pathways, and concluded that, for a likely chance, 
regional CO2 and greenhouse gas emissions would need to reach net zero roughly 10 years 
earlier than for a medium chance. For both a likely and a medium chance, the OECD90 and 
Latin America regions are projected to be the first to phase out CO2 emissions (2050–2060), 
followed by Economies in Transition, Middle East and Africa, and Asia. Lowering the likelihood 
from likely to medium matters especially for the Middle East and Africa (median phase-out of 
CO2 by around 2080 instead of 2065) and Asia (by 2095 instead of 2070). For all greenhouse 
gases, moving from a medium to a likely chance affects the phase-out year for especially the 
OECD90 countries (by 2065 instead of 2085) and the Economies in Transition (by 2080 
instead of 2100). 
 
Although there are many studies about the effect of delaying cost-optimal emission 
reductions on a global level, not many address regional or even national (cost-effective) 
emission pathways that are based on global 2 °C scenarios involving delayed emission 
reductions. Certain multi-model studies (ROSE, EMF) explore non-idealised international 
implementation based on specific assumptions about delayed and limited regional 
participation in emission reductions. The LIMITS multi-model comparison study (e.g. Tavoni 
et al., 2014 and Van Sluisveld et al., 2013) analysed the impact of full and partial 
implementation of the countries’ reduction proposals (pledges) for 2020, as part of the 
Cancun Agreements, in the context of having a likely chance of achieving the 2 °C target. It 
looks at regional mitigation strategies of five major economies (China, EU, India, Japan, and 
United States). In the multi-model comparison AMPERE project, the delayed participation 
was extended until 2030, applying cost-effective reductions towards achieving the 2 °C 
objective beyond 2030. Table 6.1 of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (Clarke et al., 
2014) gives an overview of delayed and limited participation studies. On regional cost effects 
of delay, the IPCC AR5 (Clarke et al., 2014) concludes that the higher costs of delayed action 
generally fall on the early actors. However, countries that delay mitigation only benefit from 
lower costs in the short term. In the longer term, they mostly face higher costs. 
 
The MILES project is the first study that has analysed mitigation scenarios towards staying 
below the global temperature increase of 2 °C for a much larger group of countries and 
regions, based on the full implementation of the countries’ conditional and unconditional 
2020 pledges (Van Soest et al., 2017a). It uses the scenario databases from earlier multi-
model comparison studies (LIMITS, AMPERE, EMF). This section further presents additional 
analysis, using the LIMITS and AMPERE databases as applied regionally in MILES.  
 
It should be noted that, in their spatial aggregation, not all models in the LIMITS and 
AMPERE projects include all of the countries and regions selected for the graphs in this 
section. For some countries and regions, therefore, the results are based on a lower number 
of models. Other reasons for lower numbers of models are that (i) some models do not have 
projections up to 2100, as their time horizon is 2050, and (ii) some models do not have the 
sectoral aggregation shown here. Therefore, the results for countries that are only covered 
by two models should be seen as indicative.  
Additional analysis using the LIMITS and AMPERE databases shows that a phase-out of 
greenhouse gas emissions is projected to occur earliest in Latin-American countries (after 
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2060), followed by OECD90 (including the EU), reforming economies9, and rest of the world 
(after 2070). Asia, Middle East and Africa show either no phase-out at all or at the end of the 
century. CO2 emissions are phased out earlier, starting in Latin America (2050–2070), rest of 
the world (2050), and reforming economies (2050), followed by OECD90 (including the EU) 
(2060–2070), and Middle East and Africa (2060–2100). Asia shows the latest phase-out of 
CO2 emissions (after 2070 or not at all).  
Figure 6 shows regional phase-out years for all greenhouse gases versus CO2 for scenarios 
having a likely (>66%) chance of limiting global warming to 2 °C (see also Figure 4 in Höhne 
et al., 2015). While regional differences can be observed, greenhouse gas emissions are 
generally projected to reach net zero after 2060 in both delayed and optimal mitigation 450 
ppm CO2eq scenarios (Figure 6). For CO2 emissions, delayed (2020) mitigation scenarios 
show a phase-out generally after 2050. Optimal mitigation scenarios allow for a somewhat 
later phase-out of CO2 emissions. Regional differences are most pronounced in the delayed 
mitigation scenario, with China and the EU showing a slightly later phase-out than other 
countries. In OECD countries as a group, greenhouse gas emissions are projected to peak 
immediately and reach net zero between 2070 and 2100, while those in the Middle East and 
Africa are allowed to peak between 2020 and 2030 and reach net zero after 2090. 
 
Figure 7 shows the projected phase-out years for all greenhouse gases relative to the global 
average, showing that OECD90 (except EU member states) and Latin America generally have 
earlier phase-out years than the global average and the EU due to relatively cheap negative 
emissions potential, Reforming economies are similar to or earlier than the global average, 
Middle East and Africa are similar to or later than global average (due to growing populations 
and relatively high mitigation costs, especially in energy exporting regions), and Asia is 
generally later than global average, with a large spread for China and India. 
 
  
                                               
9 Countries from the Reforming Economies of the Former Soviet Union. 
  
 PBL | 33 
Figure 6. Regional phase-out years (when emissions reach net zero) for 
greenhouse gases (upper graph) and CO2 (lower graph), in delayed mitigation 450 
ppm CO2eq scenarios (2020: left and 2030: right), based on the LIMITS and 
AMPERE databases (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015)  
 
 
Note that more models report CO2 emissions than greenhouse gas emissions. Not all models 
include all of these countries in their spatial aggregation, implying that for many countries, 
the results were based on a lower number of models. Only results for countries covered by at 
least two models are shown. No IMAGE projections for delayed (2030) mitigation scenarios 
were available. 
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Figure 7: Regional phase-out years for greenhouse gases relative to the same 
model’s global average, in delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios (2020), 
based on the LIMITS and AMPERE databases (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 
2015).  
 
Negative numbers indicate earlier phase-out, positive numbers indicate later phase-out, and 
0 indicates equal phase-out years for the region and the global average. Only results for 
regions covered by at least two models are shown. 
 
Box 3: Harmonisation 
 
The national and regional emission projections by integrated assessment models, generally, 
show historical emissions that differ from the officially reported emissions data from 
countries (national inventories) (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000; Rogelj et al., 2011). In 
particular, the discrepancies between land-use related emissions based on officially reported 
data and the IAM data are large, due to the differences in estimating the " anthropogenic" 
land-use emissions (Grassi et al., 2017). More specifically, integrated assessment models 
define anthropogenic land-use emissions based on direct human-induced effects (land-use 
changes and harvesting) on managed and unmanaged land, whereas national inventories 
use the IPCC 2006 Guidelines and include, in addition to these human-induced effects on 
land, also the sinks of managed land based on indirect human-induced effects (such as CO2 
fertilisation), and natural effects (Grassi et al., 2017). None of the scenarios in the literature 
incorporate officially reported data for land-use related emissions. The method for resolving 
this discrepancy in the historical land-use related emissions is called ‘harmonisation’.  
 
So far, the emission projections presented in this report were not harmonised. One 
methodology for harmonisation, the so-called simple ‘offset’ harmonization, is adding the 
absolute emissions difference in 2010 between the inventory data and the model data to the 
model projections (see Figure 9). Harmonising the model projections in such a way, i.e. 
shifting the absolute values of the model projections, implies that the starting points of the 
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scenarios become the same as the national inventories, without changing the trend of the 
projections. This is especially useful in the case of models using different definitions, 
meaning they may miss the sinks of managed forests. For those countries with reported 
sinks, harmonisation of LULUCF emissions/removals to national inventories is expected to 
have an effect on the timing of reaching net zero emissions (phase-out dates) by shifting the 
absolute values of the emission projections up or down. Harmonising the model projections 
also implies a change of the original emission projections.  
 
Table 6 and Figure 8 show the impact of a simple ‘offset’ harmonisation on projected phase-
out years in major emitting countries, applying an absolute correction throughout the 
century based on the modelled 2010 emission levels minus historical data for 2010 emission 
levels (see also Figure 9 for more detailed results of individual models). The historical GHG 
emissions data were taken from latest inventories, many of which have been submitted to 
the UNFCCC in 2017, as described in detail in Kuramochi et al. (2016)10. Here we focus on 
one case in addition to the default of no harmonisation: harmonisation of only land use, 
land-use change and forestry CO2 (LULUCF CO2) emissions/removals, adding unharmonised 
greenhouse gas emissions excluding LULUCF to calculate total greenhouse gas emissions (for 
more details, see Appendix IV).  
 
Harmonisation of the EU emissions is complicated by the fact that most models cover Europe 
as a region, and not the EU28, so by definition these models’ 2010 emissions are higher than 
the emissions reported for the EU28. Harmonisation of greenhouse gas emissions excluding 
LULUCF using the offset method would have a large effect, due to the artefact that models 
do not have the EU28 as a region. All models have larger 2010 emissions than historical data 
(the difference ranges from 600 to 1250 MtCO2eq). Therefore, we only show the cases no 
harmonisation and harmonisation of LULUCF CO2 emissions only.  
 
In summary, the central cases of this report assume no harmonisation, which has the 
advantage of staying as close to the original projections as possible, and offset 
harmonisation of LULUCF emissions/removals.  
 
In general, the harmonisation applied here leads to projected phase-out years for 
greenhouse gases and CO2 that are approximately 5 to 15 years earlier, as 2010 emission 
levels as calculated by models are generally higher than those from officially reported 
emissions data, in particular for LULUCF emissions (Grassi et al., 2017)11. It shifts the 
absolute value of model projections down (keeping the trend the same), resulting in earlier 
occurrence of (below) zero emissions. However, regional differences exist. For the EU, China, 
Russia, and the United States, harmonisation gives earlier phase-out years. For the United 
States, it also results in smaller spread across models.  
 
Harmonisation of LULUCF emissions only is especially interesting for China, India, Russia and 
the United States, where these emissions play an important role. In China, India, Russia and 
United States, models show either positive LULUCF CO2 emissions or negative emissions, the 
amount of which is smaller than the reported carbon sink, as historical data shows 
(approximately -421 MtCO2 for China, -175 MtCO2 for India, -950 MtCO2 for United States 
and -651 MtCO2 for Russia). As such, harmonisation leads to earlier projected phase-out 
                                               
10 The historical 2010 emissions for the G20 countries are based on the Common Reporting Format 2017 (2016 
inventory for the USA and Canada) to the UNFCCC (2017) for Annex I countries, and the national GHG 
inventory data reported in most recent Biennial Update Reports (BURs) submitted to the UNFCCC (2017) (when 
available), EDGAR database (JRC/PBL, 2014) and FAOSTAT data (land-use emissions) for non-Annex I 
countries. For World, a 2010 LULUCF emission level of 0 Gt CO2 was assumed for illustrative purposes (based 
on Grassi et al., 2017). 
11 For global LULUCF emissions/removals, Grassi et al. (2017) found a difference of around 3 GtCO2 in 2010 
between the global emissions estimates by the IPCC AR5 and the global estimate based on the national country 
reports following the IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. 
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years. Harmonisation leads to a convergence of the phase-out years for OECD countries, 
including the EU as a group, to around 2050–2070, which is earlier in time than for most of 
the non-OECD countries. Low-income countries, such as India, remain having projected 
phase-out years at the end of the century.  
 
More research on the differences between national inventories and emission levels used in 
model projections is required (Grassi et al., 2017). Most notably concerning how LULUCF 
greenhouse gas emissions and removals are included in models versus how they are 
reported under national inventories, to improve understanding of the quantitative effect of 
harmonisation on required emission reductions. 
 
Table 6. Projected regional phase-out years (median estimates) for greenhouse gas 
emissions (upper table) or CO2 emissions only (lower table), under delayed mitigation 
scenarios (2 °C, cost-optimal allocation of reductions implemented after 2020), without 
harmonisation (column 1) and with harmonisation to CO2 emissions/removals from LULUCF 
(column 2) (adding unharmonised greenhouse gas/CO2 emissions excluding LULUCF CO2 to 
calculate all greenhouse gas/CO2 emissions). Only regions that are covered by at least two 
models are shown here (these numbers should be interpreted with care, due to the limited 
number of models with varying coverage of LULUCF emissions). See Appendix IV for 
indicative results on aggregated regions. Source: analysis of this study. 
 
Phase-out year* for all greenhouse gas emissions 
Country/region [no. 
of models] 
No harmonisation Harmonisation of 
CO2 emissions from 
LULUCF  
Phase-out year 
relative to 
world (no 
harmonisation) 
China [4] 2100 2090 Same 
EU [3] No phase-out 2080 Later 
India [3] No phase-out No phase-out Later 
Japan [2] 2065 2065 Earlier 
Russia [2] 2085 2075 Earlier 
United States [4] 2065 2060 Earlier 
World [4] 2100 2085 -  
 
 
Phase-out year* for CO2 emissions 
Country/region [no. 
of models] 
No harmonisation Harmonisation of 
CO2 emissions from 
LULUCF  
Phase-out year 
relative to 
world (no 
harmonisation) 
China [4] 2075 2070 Later 
EU [3] 2080 2060 Later 
India [3] 2090 2080 Later 
Japan [2] 2055 2060 Earlier 
Russia [2] 2080 2055 Later 
United States [4] 2060 2045 Earlier 
World [4] 2065 2065 -  
* Numbers should be interpreted with care, as models generally report their emission projections with 
10-year time steps. 
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Figure 8. Effect of the harmonisation method on the phase-out year for greenhouse 
gases (upper figure) and CO2 (lower figure), in delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq 
scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
In both graphs, left: no harmonisation, right: LULUCF emissions/removals harmonised to 
2010 levels (adding unharmonised greenhouse gas [CO2] emissions excluding LULUCF CO2 to 
calculate total greenhouse gas [CO2] emissions). Source: LIMITS and AMPERE databases 
(Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015). For harmonisation of total greenhouse gas 
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emissions, historical data from Kuramochi et al. (2016) were used, and the same absolute 
correction level (modelled 2010 emission levels minus historical data for 2010 emission 
levels) was applied throughout the century. For harmonisation of CO2 emissions, historical 
data from UNFCCC (2017) were used. Note that Brazil’s projected greenhouse gas phase-out 
year, excluding LULUCF harmonisation, in reality will be 2070; it is shown as 2015 because 
that is the first year with (momentarily) negative emissions. Not all models include the same 
number of countries in their spatial aggregation, implying that for many, the results are 
based on a lower number of models. Only results for countries covered by at least two 
models are shown. 
 
Figure 9. Effect of harmonisation on the emission pathways for land use CO2 (upper 
figure) and greenhouse gases (lower figure), in delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq 
scenarios, per model and region. 
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Upper figure: unharmonised model land use CO2 emissions (blue), constant offset value 
(model data minus inventory data, green), and harmonised model land use CO2 emissions 
(red, i.e. blue minus green). These harmonised land use CO2 emissions are then added to 
the unharmonised greenhouse gas emissions excluding land use CO2, to generate total 
greenhouse gas emission pathways including land use CO2 (blue in the lower figure). Lower 
figure: total greenhouse gas emission pathways before (red) and after (blue) harmonisation. 
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Figure 10 shows peak years. Under the delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenario, all 
countries’ greenhouse gas and CO2 emissions are projected to peak no later than 2030, with 
OECD90 + EU, Latin America and Asia projected to peak earlier than reforming economies 
and the Middle East and Africa. 
 
Figure 10. Regional peak years (when net emissions are at their maximum) for 
greenhouse gases (upper graph) and CO2 (lower graph), in delayed mitigation 450 
ppm CO2eq scenarios (2020: left and 2030: right) of the LIMITS and AMPERE 
databases (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015). For most OECD90 countries, 
the 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios show a peak year in 2005, because the start year for 
model analysis was 2005. However, actual peak years may be earlier. 
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For models with multiple scenarios per category (delayed 2030), the mean was taken. Note 
that more models report CO2 emissions than greenhouse gas emissions. Only results for 
regions covered by at least two models are shown. 
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Box 4. What are the regional and national emission reductions by 2030 and 2050 
resulting from the greenhouse gas emission pathways that meet 2 oC? 
 
Table 7 and Figure 11 present an overview of the projected greenhouse gas emission 
reductions (including and excluding LULUCF CO2) for the four major economies (China, EU, 
India, and United States) by 2030 and 2050 for scenarios having a likely (>66%) chance of 
limiting global temperature increase to 2 °C during the 21st century. The net global 
greenhouse gas emissions projections for the world for the full technology cases of the 
delayed mitigation and cost-optimal 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios from the AMPERE and LIMITS 
databases were used, in particular the median estimate over the various model studies with 
projections until 2100 (see Table 12 in Appendix III for reductions using the full set of 
models). More specifically: Delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2-eq pathways, i.e. limited action 
until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards achieving the CO2-equivalent concentration 
of 450 ppm by 2100.  
 
Table 7: Projected regional greenhouse gas (including LULUCF CO2) emissions by 
2030 and 2050, relative to 2010, in delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios 
(negative numbers denote a reduction).  
China 2030 2050 
Delayed (2020) % % 
Mean [min; max] -10 [-22; 4] -60 [-78; -45] 
Median [10th percentile; 90th 
percentile] 
-12 [-20; 0] -59 [-75; -47] 
Delayed (2030) % % 
Mean [min; max] 37 [23; 54] -57 [-64; -50] 
Median [10th percentile; 90th 
percentile] 
32 [25; 50] -57 [-62; -51] 
 
EU 2030 2050 
Delayed (2020) % % 
Mean [min; max] -39 [-49; -33] -74 [-77; -73] 
Median [10th percentile; 90th 
percentile] 
-36 [-46; -33] -74 [-76; -73] 
Delayed (2030) % % 
Mean [min; max] -11 [-12; -10] -69 [-76; -61] 
Median [10th percentile; 90th 
percentile] 
-11 [-12; -11] -69 [-75; -62] 
 
India 2030 2050 
Delayed (2020) % % 
Mean [min; max] 28 [-13; 51] -20 [-36; -8] 
Median [10th percentile; 90th 
percentile] 
45 [-1; 50] -16 [-32; -10] 
Delayed (2030) % % 
Mean [min; max] 92 [92; 93] -1 [-19; 17] 
Median [10th percentile; 90th 
percentile] 
92 [92; 93] -1 [-15; 14] 
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USA 2030 2050 
Delayed (2020) % % 
Mean [min; max] -40 [-64; -30] -86 [-88; -83] 
Median [10th percentile; 90th 
percentile] 
-32 [-55; -30] -85 [-88; -84] 
Delayed (2030) % % 
Mean [min; max] -16 [-19; -11] -77 [-89; -70] 
Median [10th percentile; 90th 
percentile] 
-17 [-18; -12] -73 [-86; -71] 
 
Source: LIMITS and AMPERE databases (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015) 
Figure 11: Projected regional greenhouse gas emissions (upper: including LULUCF 
CO2, lower: excluding LULUCF CO2) by 2030 and 2050, relative to 2010, in delayed 
mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios (left: 2020, right: 2030). 
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Negative numbers denote a reduction. Bar: median, error bar: 10th – 90th percentiles. 
Source: LIMITS and AMPERE databases (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015). 
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3.4 What does greenhouse gas emissions neutrality 
mean, with respect to national CO2 and non-CO2 
emissions?  
 
Countries with early phase-out generally have a relatively large potential for 
negative emissions and relatively low emission levels of both CO2 (from the 
transport, industry and building sectors) and non-CO2 greenhouse gases. 
Contrasting the OECD90+EU region to the Latin America region shows relatively 
larger remaining F-gas and transport CO2 emissions in OECD countries, while Latin 
American countries show a relatively larger contribution from land use to negative 
emissions, albeit relatively large remaining CH4 emissions due to agricultural 
production. High potential for negative emissions from reforestation and increased 
managed forest area is related to low land costs and high forest growth rates in 
Latin America. 
 
Regional graphs of the emissions breakdown in the phase-out year are qualitatively similar to 
the global picture (Figure 5); therefore, we only show those regions that show some 
differences with the global picture (figures for other countries may be found in Appendix V). 
The EU (Figure 12) shows positive rather than negative CO2 emissions from LULUCF, 
according to the IMAGE model.  
 
Russia (reforming economies region) has relatively large potentials for negative emissions 
(1000 MtCO2eq in the phase-out year) and relatively small amounts of emissions from 
buildings and industry, contributing to early phase-out years for greenhouse gas emissions. 
China, part of the Asia region, Japan and the EU, part of the OECD90 + EU region, are also 
projected to have relatively large amounts of negative emissions in the phase-out year, but, 
at the same time, they have remaining non-CO2 emissions as well as CO2 emissions from 
transport, buildings and industry, contributing to their later phase-out for greenhouse gas 
emissions. Remaining emissions from transport, buildings, industry and non-CO2 in India, 
part of the Asia region, are compensated for by negative emissions from energy supply and 
LULUCF. In the United States, part of the OECD90 and the EU region, negative emissions 
related to energy supply and LULUCF compensate mainly for the remaining non-CO2 
emissions and to a smaller extent also for CO2 emissions from transport, buildings and 
industry.  
 
Contrasting the OECD90+EU region to the Latin America region (Figure 13) shows relatively 
larger remaining F-gas and transport CO2 emissions in OECD countries, while Latin American 
countries show a relatively larger contribution from land use to negative emissions, albeit 
relatively large remaining CH4 emissions due to agricultural production. High potential for 
negative emissions from reforestation and increased managed forest area is related to low 
land costs and high forest growth rates in Latin America. While Brazil uses productive lands 
to produce biomass and bioenergy, many times in combination with BECCS, much of the 
biomass is exported and so BECCS benefits may be accrued from other regions. This relates 
to the issue noted earlier, which requires further research: how are negative emissions 
achieved through BECCS allocated to regions? 
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Figure 12. Breakdown of emissions (MtCO2eq) in the EU, in 2100, under delayed 
mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios. 
 
 
For models with multiple scenarios within a category (delayed 2030), the mean was taken. 
See Figure 5 for a further explanation of the categories. Source: PBL calculations are based 
on the LIMITS and AMPERE databases (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015). 
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Figure 13: Breakdown of emissions (MtCO2eq) in the OECD90+EU region (upper 
graph) and in the Latin America region (lower graph), in the phase-out year, under 
delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios.  
 
 
 
 
For models with multiple scenarios within a category (delayed 2030), the mean was taken. 
See Figure 5 for a further explanation of the categories. Source: PBL calculations are based 
on the LIMITS and AMPERE databases (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015). 
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3.5 When would global greenhouse gas emissions need to 
reach net zero, under 1.5 °C scenarios? 
 
To limit global warming to 1.5 °C, emissions need to peak earlier and be reduced 
faster and deeper compared to 2 °C pathways. Global greenhouse gas emissions 
would need to reach net zero between 2050 and 2070, for a medium to likely 
chance of achieving the 1.5 °C target. 
 
Scenarios that limit global warming to 1.5 °C are being developed at the time of writing, in 
preparation of the IPCC special report on 1.5 °C. Therefore, they will not be discussed 
extensively here, as the number of available scenarios is limited and findings are likely to 
change. A few observations can be made, though, based on a few early studies on the 
subject. 
 
For limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, the story generally becomes one of ‘peak earlier, 
reduce emissions faster and deeper’. For example, Rogelj et al. (2015a) found that the 
energy system transformations in 1.5 °C scenarios are similar to those in 2 °C scenarios, but 
show faster scale-up of mitigation, especially of CO2, and deeper emission reductions by 
2030 and 2050. Global carbon neutrality would need to be reached between 2045 and 2060 
(Rogelj et al., 2015a). Schleussner et al. (2016) also show the difference between 1.5 and 2 
°C pathways, with global CO2 emissions reaching net zero around 2050 for 1.5 °C pathways 
and around 2060–2070 for 2 °C pathways. Total greenhouse gas emissions are projected to 
reach net zero around 2070 for 1.5 °C pathways and around 2080–2090 for 2 °C pathways. 
Robiou du Pont et al. (2017) show 1.5 °C pathways that reach net zero greenhouse gas 
emissions around 2075 (2059–2087). These scenarios reach, on average, 32.6 GtCO2eq by 
2030, which is lower than 2030 emission levels presented by Rogelj et al. (2015a) and UNEP 
(2016), approximately 39 GtCO2eq. Other new scenarios, developed in the ADVANCE project 
(Luderer et al., 2016), show even lower emission levels by 2030 (approximately 25 
GtCO2eq). They further show net zero emissions by 2050, which is 20 years earlier than in 
the above studies. These differences can be explained by different 2010 emission levels and 
a higher likelihood to achieve the target assumed in ADVANCE (66%, versus 50% in the 
UNEP emissions gap report), but also because these scenarios have to take drastic measures 
to reach the target, given that they incorporate more recent international pledges. A key 
finding of the ADVANCE study was further that most of the additional emission reductions in 
1.5 °C scenarios compared to 2 °C scenarios came from the demand side (efficiency 
improvements and electrification). In addition, negative emissions are required: 
cumulatively, 500 GtCO2 during this century (Luderer et al., 2016). Most recently, Rogelj et 
al. (2018) presented 1.5 °C (1.9 W/m2) scenarios under SSP assumptions, based on a set of 
scenarios from six Integrated Assessment Models. In these scenarios, greenhouse gas 
emissions are projected to peak before 2030, decline rapidly in the following decades, and 
reach net zero around 2055 – 2075. CO2 emissions are projected to reach net zero earlier. 
The timing of neutrality depends on short-term action: scenarios with 2030 emissions above 
40 Gt CO2eq per year are projected to reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions before 
2060. These scenarios see a rapid change from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy supply, 
reduced energy use and carbon dioxide removal (CDR). As the latter is debated (e.g. due to 
concerns about feasibility or the effect on land use), Van Vuuren et al. (2018) developed 
alternative deep mitigation pathways: scenarios with measures such as lifestyle change, 
additional non-CO2 greenhouse gas emission reduction, and more rapid electrification of 
energy demand. These measures reduce, but not completely eliminate, the need for CDR. 
Kriegler et al. (2018) also analysed the need for CDR in 1.5 °C scenarios, identifying the 
conditions for 1.5 °C pathways with limited CDR deployment or without temporary overshoot 
of the temperature target. These include final energy demand reduction, electrification of 
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energy end uses, and decarbonisation of energy supply. Carbon neutrality is reached before 
2050 in the 1.5 °C pathways. 
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3.6 What would the emission pathways be, when based 
on effort sharing instead of cost-optimisation?  
Future emission reduction targets based on effort-sharing approaches that account 
for equity principles are often largely determined by the way the equity principle is 
implemented. In addition, the distribution of emission reduction targets may also 
differ significantly between such approaches. This may lead to a wide range of 
outcomes, which can be implemented by countries domestically, through emissions 
trading, or financial transfers. For achieving the 2 °C target, the 2030 emission 
target levels under all effort-sharing approaches would need to be approximately 
half of the 2010 emission levels in OECD1990 countries (with a wide range), 
roughly two-thirds of the 2010 level in the Economies in Transition (EIT), roughly 
be around or slightly below the 2010 level in Asia, slightly above the 2010 level in 
the Middle East and Africa, and well below the 2010 level in Latin America. 
 
Several studies have analysed future greenhouse gas emissions allowances and reduction 
targets for different regions based on a wide range of effort-sharing approaches that account 
for equity principles (for an overview, see Höhne et al., 2014). The IPCC AR5 report (Clarke 
et al., 2014) grouped the existing effort-sharing approaches into six categories using specific 
definitions of equity principles and distributive justice, including responsibility, capability, 
equality, responsibility-capability-need, equal cumulative per capita emissions and staged 
approaches, based on Höhne et al. (2014). The principle of cost-effectiveness, which is 
modelled by applying a uniform carbon tax across all countries, is often used as a reference 
to compare approaches in the six categories with.12 Some approaches may lead to extreme 
outcomes, which might be impossible to achieve by domestic emission reductions. This can 
be overcome by allowing emissions trading between countries. 
 
The previous sections in this chapter presented regional emission pathways that were all 
based on this cost-effective approach of allocating the reductions across countries. The main 
focus of this section is to present initial allocations of emission reduction targets from a wide 
range of effort-sharing approaches based on the IPCC AR5 effort sharing categories, for 
reaching the climate goals of 2 °C and 1.5 °C of the Paris Agreement, without an assessment 
of the feasibility and costs of these approaches. As the results are based on literature, they 
are not necessarily consistent with the neutrality analyses presented in section 3.3, but are 
included as an indication of possible different allocations. 
 
Höhne et al. (2014) assessed more than 40 studies and concluded that the reduction targets 
resulting from the effort-sharing approaches are often largely determined by the way the 
equity principle is implemented. They further found that the distribution of emission 
reduction targets can differ significantly among such approaches, depending on the effort 
sharing approach used, the concentration stabilisation level and shape of the global 
emissions pathway. Höhne et al. (2014) also presented reduction targets at the level of the 
IPCC AR5 regions, and concluded that for stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations at 450 
ppm CO2eq (likely chance of achieving the 2 °C objective), the 2030 allowances under all 
effort sharing approaches would be approximately half of the 2010 emissions in OECD1990 
(with a large range), roughly two-thirds in the Economies in Transition (EIT), roughly at the 
2010 emissions level or slightly below in Asia, slightly above the 2010 level in the Middle 
                                               
12 The initial allocation based on effort sharing and a cost-effective distribution is usually not 
the same for most countries. Studies then assume that emissions allowances are traded or 
that financial transfers occur, so that reduction targets are achieved, emissions are 
sufficiently reduced globally, and costs are minimized, all at the same time (e.g. den Elzen et 
al., 2008; Hof et al., 2016). 
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East and Africa, and well below the 2010 level in Latin America. No robust conclusions were 
presented for achieving the 1.5 °C objective.  
 
The study by Robiou du Pont et al. (2017) is one of the few studies that presented countries’ 
reduction targets for 2030 and 2050 for a wide range of effort-sharing approaches for 
achieving the 2 °C and 1.5 °C objectives. It also presented the timing of net zero greenhouse 
gas emission allowances. More specifically, Robiou du Pont et al. (2017) identified global 
cost-optimal mitigation scenarios consistent with the Paris Agreement goals and allocated 
their emissions dynamically to countries according to five equity approaches, each 
representing one of the IPCC AR5 equity categories. Robiou du Pont et al. (2017) did not 
apply the responsibility category, and used the grandfathering approach for the Staged 
category, which is based on an allocation of constant emissions ratios for all countries, and 
does not assume increasing participation of countries that take on higher commitments. 
 
Table 8. Summary of timing of reaching net zero greenhouse gas emission targets, 
and emission reduction targets by 2030 and 2050 for selected countries, for 2 °C 
and 1.5 °C pathways. Averages and ranges over the five emission allocation 
approaches are presented.  
Country/ 
Region 
Climate 
goal 
Net zero year % change in net GHG emissions 
relative to 2010 levels 
  All GHG 2030 2050 
World 
2 °C 
1.5 °C 
2082 
2075 
-5 
-3 
-47 
-78 
Brazil 
2 °C 
1.5 °C 
2084 (2076 to 2100) 
2078 (2068 to 2100) 
-5 (-35 to 19) 
-36 (-28 to -54) 
-54 (-74 to -30) 
-78 (-89 to -64) 
China 
2 °C 
1.5 °C 
2075 (2057 to 2083) 
2075 (2048 to 2075) 
-27 (-59 to 6) 
-48 (-71 to -19) 
-70 (-95 to -44) 
-88 (-102 to -76) 
EU28 
2 °C 
1.5 °C 
2068 (2044 to 2083) 
2057 (2034 to 2075) 
-38 (-62 to -5) 
-62 (-84 to -33) 
-86 (-122 to -47) 
-106 (-149 to -78) 
India 
2 °C 
1.5 °C 
2087 (2082 to 2100) 
2081 (2073 to 2100) 
72 (-5 to 155) 
30 (-33 to 102) 
40 (-47 to 152) 
-24 (-78 to 63) 
Japan 
2 °C 
1.5 °C 
2067 (2038 to 2083) 
2056 (2029 to 2075) 
-46 (-72 to -5) 
-67 (-104 to -33) 
-91 (-138 to -47) 
-109 (-156 to -78) 
Russia 
2 °C 
1.5 °C 
2074 (2051 to 2083) 
2065 (2042 to 2075) 
-39 (-62 to -5) 
-57 (-73 to -33) 
-76 (-99 to -47) 
-96 (-29 to -78) 
United 
States 
2 °C 
1.5 °C 
2067 (2045 to 2083) 
2057 (2036 to 2075) 
-44 (-66 to -5) 
-64 (-80 to -33) 
-89 (-119 to -47) 
-109 (-144 to -78) 
Source: Robiou du Pont et al. (2017). 
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4. What are the 
options for negative 
emissions? 
4.1 Overview 
 
There is a range of options to generate negative emissions, each with their own 
advantages and drawbacks. Most options are either land-based or energy system 
measures. Bioenergy, combined with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), is the 
major negative emissions technology included in integrated assessment models, 
leading to projected carbon storage of 10 to 20 GtCO2 per year, in the second half 
of the century. 
 
Carbon Brief (2016) identified the following options for negative emissions (see reference for 
more information including pros and cons of each option): 
 ‘Afforestation and reforestation: Planting trees where there were previously none 
(afforestation) or restoring areas where the trees have been cut down or degraded 
(reforestation). 
 Biochar: Burning biomass to create biochar and adding it to soils where it holds on to 
its carbon for hundreds or thousands of years. 
 BECCS: Farming bioenergy crops, which extract CO2 from the atmosphere as they 
grow, and then burning them for energy and sequestering the resulting emissions 
underground. 
 ‘Blue carbon’ habitat restoration: Conservation and restoration of degraded coastal 
and marine habitats, such as salt marshes, mangroves, and seagrass beds, so they 
continue to draw CO2 out of the air. 
 Building with biomass: Using plant-based materials in construction, storing carbon 
and preserving it for as long as the building remains standing. 
 Cloud or ocean treatment with alkali: Adding alkali to clouds or the ocean to enhance 
the reaction that sees CO2 dissolve in water, removing it from the air. 
 Direct air capture: Sucking carbon dioxide out of the air and either burying it 
underground or using it in chemical processes to make anything from plastic to fuel.  
 Enhanced ocean productivity: Adding iron or nitrogen to the ocean to increase the 
rate at which tiny microscopic plants photosynthesise, thus accelerating their take up 
of atmospheric CO2. 
 Enhanced weathering: Spreading pulverised rocks onto soils and/or the ocean to 
ramp up the natural rock weathering process that takes up CO2 from the atmosphere 
and eventually sees it washed into the ocean as bicarbonate. 
 Soil carbon sequestration: Using measures, such as modern farming methods, 
grassland restoration and creation of wetlands and ponds, to reverse past losses of 
soil carbon and sequester CO2.’ 
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Minx et al. (2017) generated an overview of the literature on negative emissions 
technologies (NETs) using scientometric methods and topic modelling. They found that the 
literature on NETs has started later than the literature on climate change, but is currently 
developing more quickly. However, the literature on NETs still only accounts for 1% of the 
most recent climate change literature (2015). According to their classification (Minx et al., 
2017), discussion on NETs takes place in three different thematic clusters: energy systems, 
forestry, and other land-based measures (e.g. biochar and other soil carbon options). The 
focus in long-term mitigation scenarios has mostly been on BECCS, although recently, other 
NET options have been evaluated as well (Chen and Tavoni, 2013; Fuss et al., 2013; House 
et al., 2011; Humpenöder et al., 2014; Kreidenweis et al., 2016; Wise et al., 2009).  
 
Figure 14. Options for negative emissions.  
 
 
 
Source: Minx et al. (2017) 
 
 
Although negative emissions technologies are widely used in 2 °C scenarios from IAMs, there 
are limits to and costs related with their applicability (Smith et al., 2016). These relate to the 
use of land, water, nutrients, energy, and impacts on albedo. For options using CCS (e.g. 
DAC and BECCS), geological storage capacity could be limiting. For DAC additionally, its 
costs and energy use are currently limiting (Smith et al., 2016). For enhanced weathering, 
e.g. using olivine, large areas of land would be required, while the potential for carbon 
removal is lower than that of other negative emissions options. Afforestation and 
reforestation (see more in Section 3.2 and Chapter 4) may have unintended consequences 
such as decreased albedo and increased evapotranspiration, but are relatively cheap. 
Competition for land could be an issue for this option as well as for BECCS. Other barriers for 
BECCS could be nutrient demand and water use (Smith et al., 2016). 
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4.2 Afforestation and reforestation 
 
Afforestation and reforestation are commonly defined as direct human-induced conversion of 
non-forest to forest land through planting, seeding, and/or the human-induced promotion of 
natural seed sources. The two terms can be distinguished by how long the non-forest 
condition has prevailed. Afforestation and reforestation are commonly used options within 
IAMs to reach negative CO2 emissions; however, the range between estimates is commonly 
high. Benítez et al. (2007) project that at a price of 13.6 USD/tCO2, the annual sequestration 
from afforestation and reforestation for the first 20 years could amount to 0.5 GtCO2 per 
year on average. For the first 40 years, the average annual sequestration was estimated to 
be 0.8 GtCO2 per year. Starting from a carbon price of 5 USD/tCO2, Sathaye et al. (2006) 
have estimated that afforestation could on average contribute with 0.5 GtCO2 per year from 
2010 to 2050, and 1.3 GtCO2 per year from 2010 to 2100. Strengers et al. (2008) reported a 
mitigation potential from afforestation of up to 2.7 GtCO2 per year by the end of the twenty-
first century under the most optimistic assumptions, but indicated that around 1.2 GtCO2 per 
year would be a more realistic figure. In pessimistic cases, however, expansion of the area 
under agriculture implies that there would be no realistic potential.  
 
In terms of IAM scenarios and the scenarios assessed in the AR5 (see Figure 15), most 
scenarios show declining CO2 emissions from land use as a result of declining deforestation 
rates and a net uptake of CO2 as a result of reforestation after 2050. However, the range 
between estimates is commonly high which is illustrated by the wide range of outcomes for 
the contribution of land-use-related CO2 emissions in the scenarios assessed within the AR5. 
A similar development of the land-use emissions and removals was shown by Popp et al. 
(2017) for the SSP scenarios (see Figure 16). The SSP scenarios expect that annual CO2 
emissions would decrease steadily until the end of the century in a baseline development. 
Also, in a mitigation case (RCP2.6), the SSP scenarios expect that afforestation would 
increase terrestrial carbon sequestration, leading to a net uptake of CO2. As of 2100, the 
land-use sector is expected to sequester 3.3 GtCO2 per year in SSP1 (IMAGE), 3.7 GtCO2 per 
year in SSP2 (MESSAGE-GLOBIOM), and close to zero in SSP4 (GCAM) and SSP5 (REMIND-
MAGPIE).  
 
Figure 15. Net CO2 emissions from land use as a function over time in mitigation 
scenarios.  
 
Source: Clarke et al. (2014) (p. 436).  
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Figure 16. Change in global cumulative land-use change emissions since 2005 of 
the five SSP marker scenarios for the baseline (left column), and RCP-2.6 (right 
column) cases. 
 
  
 
Coloured lines indicate the marker model results for each SSP. Coloured bars indicate the 
range of data for 2100, across all marker and non-marker projections, for each SSP. The 
grey line shows historical trends based on RCP data. Source: Popp et al. (2017). 
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4.3 Bioenergy 
Globally, the use of negative emissions in the IPCC AR5 scenarios ranges from 0 to 
approximately 350 GtCO2 cumulatively over the second half of the century. These can be 
realised by, mostly, afforestation and bioenergy with CCS. The SSPs assume a phase-out of 
traditional biofuel use, but apply modern biofuels with varying assumptions on their potential 
(Van Vuuren et al., 2017). Global biomass use in primary energy under the RCP-2.6 
scenarios (across SSP1–5) ranges from approximately 60 to 200 EJ/year by 2050, with 
BECCS projected to store up to 8 GtCO2 by 2050 (Riahi et al., 2017; Van Vuuren et al., 
2017) (see Table 9). Smith et al. (2016) cite modelling exercises showing BECCS 
deployment in 2 °C scenarios of around 3.3 GtC/year (i.e. ~12 GtCO2). However, the 
feasibility of such large-scale deployment of BECCS is being questioned (e.g. Anderson and 
Peters, 2016; Tollefson, 2015), and often there are calls for research into the implications of 
BECCS and for a debate on the potential and risks (Geden and Schäfer, 2016). Smith et al. 
(2016) did such a study, quantifying the potential impacts of various negative emissions 
technologies on land use, water, nutrients, albedo, energy use, and greenhouse gas 
emissions. CO2 storage is assumed to be even larger under 1.5 °C scenarios (Table 9). 
 
Table 9. Projected biomass use, agricultural demand for bioenergy and CO2 storage 
by BECCS in SSP1–5 RCP-2.6 scenarios (Riahi et al., 2017), for 2050 and 2100 
(minimum – maximum over all scenarios with a radiative forcing level of 2.6 
W/m2) 
 2050 2100 
Biomass use (EJ/year) 60 – 200 Up to 475 
Biomass with CCS 0 – 160 Up to 420 
Biomass without CCS 20 – 180 Up to 350 
Energy crops (EJ/year) 0 – 130 Up to 400 
Agricultural demand for 
bioenergy (Million tonnes 
dry matter per year) 
480 – 9350 2290 – 23382 
CO2 storage by BECCS 
(GtCO2 per year) 
0.17 – 8 2 - 21 
 
Table 10. Cumulative CO2 storage in 1.5 °C and 2 °C scenarios. Source: Schaeffer et 
al. (2015) 
 Until 2050 (GtCO2) Until 2100 (GtCO2) 
Total cumulative CO2 
storage  
  
Returning warming to below 
1.5 °C by 2100 with 
50% chance 
135 (100–235) 790 (420–1070) 
Holding warming to below 2 
°C during the 21st century 
with 66% chance 
105 (75–170) 790 (555–990) 
Cumulative storage for 
CO2 from biomass energy 
  
Returning warming to below 
1.5 °C by 2100 with 
50% chance 
45 (5–165) 520 (155–955) 
Holding warming to below 2 
°C during the 21st century 
with 66% chance 
22 (5–75) 440 (155–780) 
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Additional analysis – LIMITS and AMPERE 
 
In delayed mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios, storage of CO2, using CCS, is projected to 
range from 0 to 6 GtCO2 globally, while CCS in combination with biomass is projected to 
store 12 to 17 GtCO2 in the phase-out year for greenhouse gas emissions (Figure 17), well 
within the SSP range in the 2.6 W/m2 scenarios. Regionally, these numbers may differ, but 
IAMs project deployment of both CCS and BECCS in many countries, with China and the 
United States both storing 1 to 4 GtCO2 (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 17. Globally stored amounts of CO2 in the phase-out year, in delayed 
mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios (excluding IMAGE and WITCH, as they do not 
project a phase-out year for global greenhouse gas emissions) 
 
CCS means ‘total carbon dioxide emissions captured and stored in geological deposits (e.g. in 
depleted oil and gas fields, unmined coal seams, saline aquifers) and the deep ocean, stored 
amounts should be reported as positive numbers’. ‘CCSbio’ means ‘total carbon dioxide 
emissions captured from bioenergy use and stored in geological deposits’. ‘CCS’ does not 
include ‘CCSbio’ to avoid double counting (i.e. CCS shown here was calculated as total 
reported CCS minus ‘CCSbio’). Source: PBL calculations are based on the LIMITS and 
AMPERE databases (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015). 
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Figure 18. Regionally stored amounts of CO2 in the phase-out year, in delayed 
mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios (China and United States are shown as 
examples with relatively large amounts of negative emissions) 
 
 
CCS means ‘total carbon dioxide emissions captured and stored in geological deposits (e.g. in 
depleted oil and gas fields, unmined coal seams, saline aquifers) and the deep ocean, stored 
amounts should be reported as positive numbers’. ‘CCSbio’ means ‘total carbon dioxide 
emissions captured from bioenergy use and stored in geological deposits’. ‘CCS’ does not 
include ‘CCSbio’ to avoid double counting (i.e. CCS shown here was calculated as total 
reported CCS minus ‘CCSbio’). Source: PBL calculations are based on the LIMITS and 
AMPERE databases (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 2015). 
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4.4 Microalgae production 
 
Intensive development of microalgae could be exploited as a source for animal 
feedstock, thereby freeing up land for forest plantations and providing emissions 
mitigation from the energy and LULUC sectors of up to 544 ± 107 GtC by 2100. 
 
Walsh et al. (2015) studied the potential development and use of microalgae as an energy 
source, feedstock for livestock and potential land-sparing consequences of its development. 
The authors argue that intensive development of microalgae can be exploited as a source of 
animal feedstock, offsetting anticipated growth in demand for meat and dairy while allowing 
vast areas of agricultural land to be repurposed for biomass production or habitat 
restoration. Overall, the authors argue that microalgae and its use as a feedstock can free up 
to 2 billion hectares of land currently used for pasture and feed crops. Forest plantations 
established on these areas can conceivably meet 50% of global primary energy demand, 
resulting in emissions mitigation from the energy and LULUC sectors of up to 544 ± 107 GtC 
by 2100. 
 
4.5 Storing carbon in woody products 
 
Studies assessing the potential climate benefits of wood use show that forest 
harvest reduction scenarios have the largest short term (2030) climate benefits, 
while scenarios increasing consumption of long-lived woody products (i.e. 
construction sector) have the largest long term (2100) climate benefit. 
 
Few studies have assessed and quantified the potential climate benefits of increased 
consumption of woody products to substitute carbon intensive materials (material 
substitution) on a national or global level. One assessment by Rüter et al. (2016) analyses 
the combined effect of policy scenarios on the following carbon pools: carbon sequestration 
and storage in EU forests, carbon storage in harvested wood products in the EU, substitution 
of wood products for functionally equivalent materials and substitution of wood for other 
sources of energy, and displacement of emissions from forests outside the EU. The study 
focuses on the EU28 and analyses consequences of the policy scenarios, in terms of total 
greenhouse gas effect. The study finds that a scenario with a strong increase in the material 
use of wood (especially the construction sector) can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
using alternative materials, compared to the ClimWood2030 reference scenario, by 11 
Mt CO2eq yr-1 on average (see scenario ‘Strongly increase use of wood (V) ’ in Figure 19 
below). 
 
It is important to note that the authors only assess the climate benefits for the period of 
2000 until 2030. Studies on a national level for example for Switzerland and Sweden have 
shown that scenarios having the strongest short-term mitigation effect (i.e. 2030) can be the 
opposite of the scenario having the strongest long-term mitigation potential (i.e. 2100) 
(Taverna et al., 2007; Lundmark et al., 2014). Both of these studied showed that in the 
short term, the scenario with the largest mitigation potential is that of reducing harvest and 
increasing carbon stocks in forest. However, in the long term, the studies showed that the 
scenario with the largest mitigation potential is that of increased consumption of long-lived 
woody products.  
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Figure 19. Average annual impact under scenarios for EU-28 parameters on 
greenhouse gas balances, as compared to the ClimWood2030 reference scenario, 
2021–2030 period, detailed per contributor [in Mt CO2eq/year]. 
 
 Source: Rüter et al. (2016) 
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5. Land-use 
implications of 
achieving greenhouse 
gas emissions 
neutrality 
5.1 What are the land-use implications of 2 °C scenarios? 
 
The implications of the Shared Socio-Economic Pathways (SSPs) and Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RCPs) for possible land-use change and consequences for the 
agricultural system, food provision and prices as well as greenhouse gas emissions were 
assessed by Popp et al. (2017). For the assessment, five IAMs with distinctive land-use 
modules were used for the translation of the SSP narratives into quantitative projections. 
The five models that were included in the assessment were IMAGE (for more details, see 
Doelman et al., 2018), MESSAGE-GLOBIOM, AIM/CGE, GCAM4, and REMIND-MAGPIE. This 
chapter assesses the implications of scenarios with a likely (>66%) chance of limiting global 
temperature to below 2 °C, and focuses on the SSP2 RCP-2.6 scenario (hereafter referred to 
as 2 °C scenarios). The SSP2 RCP-Baseline scenario represents a baseline scenario 
development without climate change mitigation efforts (hereafter referred to as a baseline 
scenario), for which greenhouse gas concentrations are projected to stabilise at 785 ppm 
CO2eq (Fricko et al., 2017). Further information concerning the outcomes of other scenarios 
can be found in Popp et al. (2017). 
 
(a) What are the general land-use implications related to 2 °C scenarios? 
 
According to integrated assessment models (IAMs) (i.e. IMAGE, MESSAGE-
GLOBIOM, AIM/CGE, GCAM4, REMIND-MAGPIE), the dynamics of agricultural land 
are expected to be affected by land-demanding mitigation options, such as 
afforestation, avoided deforestation, improved agricultural management and 
bioenergy crop production. 
 
Under a baseline scenario, population dynamics, per capita caloric consumption and animal 
calorie shares increase, moderately (Popp et al., 2017). As a consequence, global demand 
for crops (plus 2860 million tonnes dry matter by 2100, about 76% increase from 2005 
levels) and livestock products (plus 235 million tonnes dry matter by 2100, about 94% 
increase from 2005 levels) increases, moderately, under the scenario with the largest shares 
and increases in demand, over time, in most Asian countries with the exception of the Middle 
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East, Japan and the former Soviet Union states (ASIA). Cropland use, for food and feed 
production, generally increases, moderately, in the IAMs (average increase of 183 million ha, 
between 2010 and 2100) (see Figure 20). This is due to relatively high demand, combined 
with high yield increases (by a factor of 1.6, between 2005 and 2100). Agricultural expansion 
mainly occurs in the Middle East and Africa (MAF) as well as in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAM), as a result of medium demand for livestock products that will be met 
mostly through rather extensive livestock production systems. This agricultural land 
expansion mainly occurs at the expense of forests (LAM) and other natural areas (MAF). The 
IAMs all expect that the global forest area will decrease, over time (average decrease of 147 
million ha, between 2010 and 2100), and that a moderate amount of land will be set aside 
for growing ligno-cellulosic bioenergy crops or energy crops13 (average increase of 193 
million ha, between 2010 and 2100). 
 
The IAMs diverge in the future development of pasture area in the baseline scenario. IMAGE 
and MESSAGE-GLOBIOM expect that the area of pastureland will increase by 109 million ha 
and 212 million ha, between 2010 and 2100. On the other hand, AIM/CGE, REMIND-MAGPIE 
and GCAM4 expect that pastureland will decrease by an average of 90 million ha from 2010 
until 2100. In AIM/CGE and GCAM4, the decrease in pastureland is happening as a result of 
areas being set aside for growing energy crops. 
 
For 2 °C scenarios dynamics of agricultural land for food and feed production are affected by 
land demanding mitigation options such as bioenergy, avoided deforestation or afforestation. 
As a result of land needed for large scale bioenergy production and afforestation programs in 
the 2 °C scenarios, the use of land for food and feed production, pasture, and other natural 
land are generally expected to be reduced (see Figure 21). In IAMs, the median global 
allocation of land to ligno-cellulosic bioenergy crop production is 600 million ha in 2100, due 
to the demand for wood in energy production and active carbon dioxide removal from the 
atmosphere (BECCS) (see Section 5.1(b)). The land system can also contribute to climate 
change mitigation by increasing carbon stocks and reducing current emissions. Related to 
these mitigation efforts, the global forest area is expected to increase, in order to sequester 
more carbon through afforestation and reduce emissions related to deforestation events (see 
Section 5.1(c), for further details). 
 
Land demanding mitigation options, including energy crops and afforestation, are expected 
by the IAMs to increase the pressures on the land system and generally occur at the expense 
of pastureland (average decrease of 493 million ha, from 2010 to 2100) and other natural 
land that is not cultivated (average decrease of 386 million ha, from 2010 to 2100). Pricing 
of non-CO2 emissions from the livestock sector is also a reason for the reduction in 
pastureland in the models, in particular for greenhouse-gas-emission-intensive production 
systems (see Section 5.1(c) below, for further details). Loss of pastureland is expected to 
mainly take place in Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and Africa, as well as 
OECD. Loss of other natural land is also expected to be highly concentrated in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Middle East, but also in the Reforming Economies of Eastern Europe and 
the Former Soviet Union. Regional mitigation pressures on the land systems, such as avoided 
deforestation restricts agricultural expansion in the 2 °C scenarios and leads to a reduction of 
agricultural land for food and feed purposes. The use of cropland for food and feed 
production generally decreases moderately in the IAMs (average decrease of 111 million ha 
between 2010 and 2100). 
  
                                               
13 Ligno-cellulosic bioenergy crops or energy crops here mean crops such as miscanthus, reed canary grass, 
and quickly growing tree species such as poplar and willow.  
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Figure 20. Future change in land use for a baseline scenario (SSP2 RCP-Baseline), 
in the five IAMs, compared to 2010 estimates. 
 
A positive value indicates an increase in the type of land use for that year, compared to the 
2010 situation; a negative value indicates a decrease. Source: Popp et al. (2017) 
 
Figure 21. Future change in land use for the five IAMs as compared to 2010 
estimates for a 2 °C scenario (SSP2 RCP-2.6). 
 
Source: Popp et al. (2017)  
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(b) How much land area would be needed to grow energy crops? 
 
Dedicated energy crops are expected to play a critical role in 2 °C scenarios. The 
global area of land dedicated to energy crops, however, varies significantly across 
IAMs. The 2 °C scenarios project that, by 2100, between 180 million ha (IMAGE) 
and 1084 million ha (GCAM) are expected to be allocated to energy crops — 
compared to currently less than one million ha. 
 
The IAMs, generally, expect dedicated second-generation bioenergy crops, or energy crops, 
to be developed already under the baseline scenario (the SSP2 RCP-Baseline scenario). The 
global amount of land set aside for energy crops by 2100 is assessed to be between 15 and 
250 million ha (see Figure 22 left column).  
 
For 2 °C scenarios, all IAMs assessed by Popp et al. (2017) show that dedicated second-
generation bioenergy crops will play a critical role in nearly all mitigation scenarios, as they 
provide an option to reduce emissions from the electricity and transport sectors and allow for 
active carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere if combined with carbon capture and 
storage (BECCS) (see Figure 22, right column). However, the range of future global land 
area set aside for energy crops varies significantly across models for scenarios with a likely 
chance of staying below 2 °C. In 2050, the IAMs globally allocate between 130 million ha 
(IMAGE) and 470 million ha (GCAM4) of land to dedicated energy crops. In 2100, the IAMs 
allocate globally between 180 million ha (IMAGE) and 1080 million ha (GCAM4) of land to 
dedicated energy crops. 
 
Figure 22. Future change in dedicated energy crops for the five IAMs for the 
baseline scenario (left column) and a 2 °C scenario (right column).  
  
Source: Popp et al. (2017) 
 
The regional distribution of dedicated energy crops varies significantly between the models, 
but some similarities can be noted between the IAMs (see Figure 23). Generally, energy 
crops are expected to be particularly concentrated in OECD, ASIA, and the Middle East and 
Africa as a result of high yields potentials combined with relatively low development costs of 
energy crop plantations for these regions. AIM/CGE, IMAGE, and GCAM4 all expect that the 
lion’s share of dedicated energy crops share of dedicated energy plantations would come 
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from the OECD regions by 2100. The models expect that the OECD region will contribute to 
34% (AIM/CGE), 35% (IMAGE), and 51% (GCAM4) of the global land dedicated to energy 
crops. MESSAGE-GLOBIOM and REMIND-MAGPIE also expect that large areas of energy 
crops will be developed in the OECD region, but they expect the lion’s share to come from 
Asia (27% of global energy crops for MESSAGE-GLOBIOM) and Middle East and Africa (30% 
of global energy crops for REMIND-MAGPIE). IMAGE, MESSAGE-GLOBIOM and REMIND-
MAGPIE all expect the smallest amount of dedicated energy crops from the countries from 
the Reforming Economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. 
 
Figure 23. Future regional distribution of dedicated energy crops for a 2 °C 
scenario. 
 
Regional aggregations are as follows: REF: Reforming Economies of Eastern Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union; OECD: OECD 90 and EU Member States and candidates; ASIA: most 
Asian countries with the exception of the Middle East, Japan and Former Soviet Union states; 
MAF: Middle East and Africa; LAM: Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Source: Popp et al. (2017). 
 
(c) How do these strategies impact the forest area? 
 
The forest area is a function of possible reforestation/afforestation actions, on the 
one hand, and possible deforestation resulting from bio-energy production. On 
average, most models see a reduction of deforestation rates. The net loss of forest 
land would need to be halted by 2030 and change to an increase in forest area 
thereafter. The projected increase in forest area varies significantly between IAMs. 
The increase in global forest area ranges from a moderate 150 million ha (REMIND-
MAGPIE), to a significant 820 million ha (AIM/CGE) for the year 2100, compared to 
the situation of 2010. 
 
Forests are generally expected by the IAMs to play a significant role in mitigating climate 
change and it is expected that 2 °C scenarios will lead to an increase in forest area as 
compared to baseline scenarios without mitigation efforts (the SSP2 Baseline scenario) (see 
Figure 24).  
 
The global forest area is expected by all the IAMs to decrease over time in a baseline 
scenario. Net loss of forest land is only expected to be reached between 2050 and 2090, 
after which some gains in net forest area are expected. The global forest area in 2100 is 
expected to be reduced by 20 million ha (MESSAGE-GLOBIOM) to 270 million ha (AIM/CGE) 
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as compared to 2010 levels. Given that forests globally cover roughly 3900 million ha today, 
this decrease is relatively small and generally based on the expectation that the 
deforestation rate will decrease in an SSP2 scenario (Fricko et al., 2017).  
 
In 2 °C scenarios, the net loss of forest areas is expected to be halted at the global level by 
2030, and all IAMs expect that the net forest area will be increasing from 2030 onwards. As 
such, the global forest area is expected to increase, compared to developments under the 
baseline scenario (see Figure 24). Overall, avoided deforestation and increased afforestation 
efforts are expected to lead to a moderate increase of the global forest area (average 
increase of 183 million ha from 2010 to 2100). However, the increase of the global forest 
area diverges significantly between the models. The IAMs expect that the global forest area 
will be increased by 150 million ha (REMIND-MAGPIE) to 820 million ha (AIM/CGE) by the 
year 2100 and relative to the baseline scenario.  
 
Figure 24. Future change in global forest land for the baseline (solid lines) and a 
2 °C scenario (dotted lines).  
 
 
Source: Popp et al. (2017) 
 
In terms of the regional distribution of the expected increase in the global forest area for 
2 °C scenarios, all IAMs expect that the lion’s share of the increase in forest area would 
come from the regions of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAM) and the Middle East and 
Africa (MAF) (see Table 11). The models expect that these two regions will contribute by as 
much as 100% (REMIND-MAGPIE), 80% (GCAM), 75% (MESSAGE-GLOBIOM), 51% 
(IMAGE), and 48% (AIM/CGE) to the global increase in the forest land. Other regions for 
which the individual models are expecting high increases in forest area are Asia (IMAGE), 
OECD (AIM/CGE and MESSAGE-GLOBIOM), and the reforming economies of eastern Europe 
and the Former Soviet Union (REF) (GCAM). The AIM/CGE, IMAGE, MESSAGE-GLOBIOM and 
REMIND-MAGPIE models all expect the smallest increase in forest land to take place in the 
REF region. 
 
It should be noted that the increase in forest area, in the IAMs, is driven by three main 
mitigation options: the demand for wood for bioenergy purposes, the need to reduce 
emissions from deforestation and the need to increase afforestation to sequester carbon. The 
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extent to which the various IAM models rely on these three general mitigation options varies 
significantly due to model assumptions and data sources being used. 
 
 
Table 11. Regional change in forest land area (million ha) for a 2 °C scenario 
compared to a baseline scenario. All estimates are for the year 2100.  
  IMAGE 
MESSAGE-
GLOBIOM 
GCAM4 
REMIND-
MAGPIE 
AIM/CGE 
OECD 19 101 -48 3 191 
REF 14 2 154 -11 147 
ASIA 90 53 24 7 83 
MEF 119 140 284 116 173 
LAM 167 330 229 35 223 
World 408 627 643 150 817 
Source: Popp et al. (2017) 
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5.2 What could be food price implications of the 2 °C 
scenarios? 
As shown in other publications, additional land-use for mitigation has impacts on 
food prices and biodiversity. However, food availability and agricultural commodity 
prices may differ significantly, depending on how mitigation policies are 
implemented and which sectors are specifically targeted by a policy measure. 
 
In a baseline scenario, SSP2, SSP4 and SSP5 show either flat or slightly falling world market 
prices for crops and livestock products by 2100, compared to 2005 (see Figure 25).  
 
For 2 °C (450 ppm CO2eq) scenarios, land based mitigation measures are expected to cause 
world market prices to increase relative to 2005 in the SSP2 (+110%), SSP5 (+170%) and 
SSP4 (+570%) scenarios as a result of the uniform carbon tax14, changes in agricultural 
management, increased bioenergy production, and land used for afforestation. In SSP1, 
mitigation hardly influences food prices due to a general ‘food first’ policy, which can restrict 
agricultural expansion to avoid deforestation, but further only allows bioenergy on areas not 
needed for food and feed production. In general, considerable agricultural intensification 
(such as in SSP5), responses in agricultural trade (such as in SSP4 and SSP5), and changes 
in total production and consumption (such as in SSP2) have the capability to diminish food 
price reactions.  
 
It can be noted that the uncertainty across models for food prices is significant, with GCAM 
projecting much larger increases in the mitigation cases than other models. These price 
effects in GCAM are due to the strong dependence on afforestation and bioenergy as 
mitigation options, leading to significant land competition. Due to this uncertainty, the 
selection of marker models strongly influences the ranking of this variable, unlike previous 
results. In the mitigation cases, all models show food prices that are lower in SSP1 and 
higher in SSP3 than the SSP2 in 2100. Food prices in SSP4 are smaller than (GCAM) or equal 
to (AIM) prices in SSP2. Food prices in the SSP5 are higher than the SSP2 in all models. 
While the qualitative ordering is robust across models, the magnitude of change differs 
significantly across models, with GCAM showing higher increases due to mitigation than any 
other model. 
 
  
                                               
14 A tax is implemented in the models such that the sources of emissions are taxed according to a specific 
carbon price. 
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Figure 25. Change in world market prices [2005 = 1] aggregated across all crop 
and livestock commodities of the five SSP marker scenarios for the baseline (left 
column) and RCP-2.6 (right column) cases 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that the left and right columns have individual scales. Coloured lines indicate the 
marker model results for each SSP. Coloured bars indicate the range of data in 2100 across 
all marker and non-marker projections for each SSP (models are depicted by icon). Source: 
Popp et al. (2017). 
 
It should be noted that in the assessment by Popp et al. (2017) mitigation policies are 
generally implemented through a uniform global carbon tax that directly implies a negative 
effect on agriculture and livestock production through the greenhouse gas emission intensity 
of the production system. As implemented for the assessment, climate mitigation policies 
directly impact the total level of revenue for agriculture producers through changes in the 
cost of production (pricing of emissions).  
 
It has been argued that the way that mitigation policies are implemented can have large 
implications on sectorial and regional food production. Havlík et al. (2014) have shown that 
the carbon price effects on food availability can largely differentiate whether a carbon price 
targets non-CO2 emissions from agriculture or CO2 emissions from land-use change. Havlík 
et al. (2015) have also shown that agricultural commodity prices would be affected very 
differently depending on the targeted sectors. If only non-CO2 emissions from the agriculture 
sector were to be targeted by a carbon price, the impact on prices would be about half 
compared to the idealised policy implementation (costing of greenhouse gas emissions from 
all economic sectors) by 2030. Targeting only CO2 emissions from land-use change and 
forest management would have almost no effect on crop prices, and also the effect on 
livestock prices would be just about a third compared to the idealised policy implementation.  
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5.3 What could be the biodiversity implications of the 2 
°C scenarios? 
Some models project that under the baseline scenario, developments may lead to 
the conversion of a significant number of high biodiversity areas (220 million ha, 
globally, over the period from 2010 to 2050). Staying at or below the 2 °C 
temperature increase may have a relatively limited negative impact on the 
conversion of high biodiversity areas, and may only lead to an additional 20 million 
ha of high biodiversity areas being converted, globally, by 2050. 
 
One study that assesses the potential biodiversity implications of global mitigation scenarios 
is that by Böttcher et al. (2016). While the study has an EU policy focus, it also assesses the 
biodiversity implications of global mitigation scenarios. In terms of biodiversity, the study 
assesses the conversion of land with a high biodiversity value (HBV), based on the UNEP-
UCMC biodiversity atlas for a Baseline and number of policy scenarios. The study uses the 
development of high biodiversity value (HBV) as a key indicator for assessing the effects on 
biodiversity, as the conversion of these areas is very likely related to biodiversity loss. This 
applies to forests, grazing land and other natural land, in particular.  
 
Overall, the baseline scenario has been designed to be as comparable as possible to the 
2013 EU Reference Scenario (Commission, 2013) used in the 2014 IA report (Commission, 
2014). The ‘Increased RoW bioenergy demand scenario’ represented a situation in which 
joint global efforts are taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions beyond 2020, thereby 
enhancing the development of the bioenergy sector for the RoW and the EU. The scenario 
assumes higher targets for the EU and the RoW, in terms of greenhouse gas emission 
reduction, in comparison to the baseline scenario. This in turn is expected to lead to globally 
increasing demand for biomass for energy purposes and globally increasing pressure to 
produce biomass resources. For RoW, the bioenergy demand is based on the 2015 Global 
Mitigation scenario (Labat et al., 2015) as jointly developed based on the POLES and GEM-E3 
models. This scenario reflects that joint international actions are taken to reduce global 
emissions in line with achieving the 2 °C objective and where all regions put into play actions 
that lead to a lower greenhouse gas emission pathway. For further details concerning the 
scenarios we refer to Forsell et al. (2016). 
 
The study found that in the Rest of the World (RoW), the expected conversion of HBV areas 
was significantly higher in the Baseline development than the additional conversion of HBV 
areas for reaching the ‘Increased RoW bioenergy demand scenario’ (see Figure 26). As much 
as 220 million ha of HBV areas was expected to be converted during the period of 2010 until 
2050 in the Baseline scenario development. Unused forests form the largest share of the 
areas impacted, followed by other natural land and grazing land. This can be compared to 
the development in the ‘Increased RoW bioenergy demand scenario’ where only an additional 
20 million ha of HBV areas are expected to be converted.  
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Figure 26. Projected changes of HBV areas in RoW a) in the baseline, b) in the 
baseline between 2010 and 2030/2050 and c) in different scenarios and years 
compared to the baseline. Source: Böttcher et al. (2016). 
 
 
 
  
PBL | 72  
5.4 How much forest land would be dedicated to 
producing biomass for the energy sector and how 
intensively would forests be used, under the 2 °C 
scenarios? 
 
To achieve the 2 °C target, by the end of the century, a roughly projected 184 
million ha of forest land would be required to directly produce roundwood for the 
bioenergy sector, and the global intensity of forest resource use would increase 
from 30% in 2010 to 57% by 2100. 
Few studies have assessed the amount of forest land that in a 2 °C scenario can be expected 
to be set aside strictly to grow biomass for energy purposes or the amount of roundwood of 
industrial roundwood quality that is expected to be harvested directly for bioenergy 
purposes15. One of the reasons for this is that except for traditional fuelwood16, almost no 
forest areas are currently being set aside to grow woody biomass only for energy purposes 
(Keenan et al., 2015). In addition to fuelwood, it is rather forest residues17 (such as 
branches and tops) and industrial by-products18 (such as wood chips and sawdust) that are 
currently the main biomass sources being used for energy purposes.  
 
One study that has assessed the global impact of a 2 °C scenario on the future woody 
biomass use and forest land dedicated to energy production is that of Lauri et al. (2017). The 
study utilised the GLOBIOM modelling framework to assess the effect of achieving the 2 °C 
objective on future forest harvest levels and the use of woody biomass feedstocks for energy 
and material purposes. The assessment found that in a baseline scenario without strong 
mitigation efforts (i.e. SSP2 RCP-Baseline), only minor amounts of roundwood are expected 
to be harvested directly for energy use and the global forest harvest level is expected to only 
increase from roughly 3.7 Gm3 in 2010 to 4.1 Gm3 in 2100 (see Figure 27). The main 
underlying reason for this development is that fuelwood consumption is expected to be 
phased out by 2080 to electricity and modern cooking fuels by income growth, urbanisation 
and active investment policies (Fricko et al., 2017). This development would free-up 
significant forest resources for the development of the material sector. Furthermore, the 
strong increase in the production of woody materials (see Figure 29) is expected to deliver 
large quantities of industrial by-products and supply the expected growth in the bioenergy 
sector.  
 
                                               
15 Roundwood that is directly used for energy production in small or large conversion facilities. This 
category does not include the wood biomass obtained from industrial by-products, nor firewood 
(household use of energy for fuel), nor forest residues. As such, the category accounts for stem 
wood that is of industrial roundwood quality and could be used for material purposes by the 
forest-based sector but that is instead being used for energy production. 
16 Fuelwood is roundwood being used as fuel for such purposes as cooking, heating or power 
production. It includes wood harvested from main stems, branches and other parts of trees (where 
these are harvested for fuel) and wood that is used for the production of charcoal (e.g. in pit kilns 
and portable ovens), wood pellets and other agglomerates. 
17 Forest residues are typically leftover branches, stumps and stem tops from logging operations – 
thinning or final felling, chipped and mostly used for energy production. Forest residues are 
gathered from the logging site and forwarded to the roadside to be loaded on truck for long 
distance transport. 
18 Industrial by-products include industrial chips, sawdust, shavings, trimmings and bark. They are 
supplied as by-products available in proportions from the processes of wood products industry, 
mainly sawmilling but also wood based panels and joinery production. Industrial by-products have 
to be clean and they are not altered by any chemical process. They are important raw materials 
for pulp, wood based panels (Particleboard, MDF/HDF) and wood pellet production as well as in 
bioenergy production as such. 
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On the contrary, for 2 °C the study found that roundwood and logging residues are expected 
to become important sources of feedstock for the bioenergy sector. As much as 2.4 Gm3 of 
roundwood and 2.8 Gm3 of logging residues are expected to globally be used directly for 
energy purposes by the year 2100. This can be compared to the total global harvest of 
fuelwood in 2010, which has been estimated to be in the range of 2.1 Gm3 in 2010 
(FAOSTAT). In terms of area, the study assessed that by 2100 roughly 184 million ha of 
forest land would be dedicated to grow roundwood specifically dedicated for the bioenergy 
sector, and that logging residues would be expected to be harvested from as much as 911 
million ha of forest land. The main underlying reason for this development is that by-
products are not sufficient to satisfy the strong development of high bioenergy demand after 
2060 and that intensification in the use of forest can be done to a generally low cost. 
  
PBL | 74  
Figure 27. Global harvest of woody biomass from forests to be used for material 
and energy purposes in the baseline scenario (SSP2 RCP-Baseline) (left column) 
and the 2 °C scenario (SSP2 RCP-2.6) (right column) 
  
 It should be noted that roundwood here refers to both pulplogs and sawlogs being harvested 
for material and energy use. Also, estimates do not include woody biomass from dedicated 
bioenergy crops. Source: Lauri et al. (2017). 
 
The increase in bioenergy demand, under the 2 °C scenario, is also expected to increase the 
intensity with which the world’s forests resources will be used. The intensity of forest 
resources use is a common measure of how intensively forest resources are being used and 
it is calculated as the share of the annual increment that is being harvested (i.e. harvest / 
forest growth)19. As of 2010, the global intensity of forest resources use was 30% and is 
expected to increase to roughly 35% by 2100 in the baseline scenario and to 57% for the 2 
°C scenario (see Figure 28). Under the 2 °C scenario, the intensity of forest resource use is 
expected to increase the most in South America, Asia and Africa. The reason for this is high 
forest productivity, relatively low production costs, and it’s the regions where large amounts 
of roundwood are expected to be used directly for energy purposes. In Africa, Asia and South 
America, the intensity in forest resource use is expected to increase from 21% to 51% 
(Africa), from 55% to 86% (Asia) and from 27% to 48% (South America), by 2100, 
compared to 2010 levels. In North America, Russia and EU28, the intensity is expected to 
only increase modestly from 43% to 55% (Africa), from 20% to 30% (Asia) and from 86% 
to 95% (South America), by 2100, compared to 2100. 
 
  
                                               
19 Harvest intensity is measured as the percentage of the forest growth that is being harvested for a specific 
year. The intensity of forest resources use thereby depends on the share of available forest area that used for 
production as well as on the intensity of forest management in the total forest area (i.e. managed forests, 
afforested areas and primary forests). It should be noted that the intensity measure commonly only covers 
roundwood removals and not the harvest of forest residues.  
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Figure 28. Regional intensity of forest resource use for the baseline (SSP2 RCP-
Baseline) (left column) and the 2 °C scenario (SSP2 RCP-2.6) (right column) 
 
  
Intensity of forest resource use is defined as the share of forest growth that is being 
harvested. Source: Lauri et al. (2017). 
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5.5 What are the implications of the 2 °C scenarios for 
forest-based industries? 
No significant distortions to woody material markets are expected, and there could 
even be beneficial effects for certain forest-based industries. 
 
Development of the bioenergy sector in-line with a likely chance of staying below 2 °C is 
commonly expected to lead to high competition for biomass resources and distortion of 
woody biomass material use. However, relatively few studies have assessed the effects of 
staying below 2 °C on the global woody biomass use and implications for the forest based 
industries. Raunikar et al. (2010) studied the effects of IPCC SRES scenarios (IPCC 2000) on 
the global woody biomass use by using the Global Forest Products Model (GFPM). They 
conclude that moving from a low mitigation scenario (A2) to a high mitigation scenario (A1B) 
would lead to 3 times higher roundwood prices and 15% decrease in the woody biomass 
material use as of 2060. Favero and Mendelsohn (2013) studied the effects of reaching 
different radiative forcing levels on the global woody biomass use 2010–2100 by using the 
Global Timber Model (GTM) and the WITCH integrated assessment model. They concluded 
that mitigation efforts necessary for reaching a radiative forcing level of 2.5 W/m2 would lead 
to almost 2 times higher roundwood prices and 80% decrease in the woody biomass material 
use as of 2100, as compared to the development foreseen for a baseline scenario with no 
mitigation policies that would lead to a radiative forcing level of 6.6 W/m2 radiative forcing 
level. 
 
On the contrary, a study by Lauri et al. (2017) is showing that the bioenergy sector can be 
developed in-line with a likely chance of staying below 2 °C without significant distortions to 
the production of woody materials. Furthermore, the study shows that such a development 
of the bioenergy sector could even have beneficial effects for certain forest industries (see 
Figure 29). Overall, staying below 2 °C is expected to lead to a small increase in the total 
global production of harvested woody materials (less than 5%). The reason for this is that 
the higher bioenergy demand is expected to increase the demand for forest industry by-
products (e.g. sawdust, wood chips, bark), making material production more profitable for 
industries that provide large shares of by-products and thereby compensating the cost effect 
of increased competition for raw materials. 
 
The study applied the GLOBIOM modelling framework and analysed the implications of 
scenario in-line with a likely chance of staying below 2 °C (450 ppm CO2eq scenarios – i.e. 
SSP2 RCP-2.6), and a baseline scenario without mitigation efforts (SSP2 RCP-Baseline). A 
strong growth in the production of woody materials, and in particular sawnwood, is expected 
for the baseline scenario. The main drivers of the increase in the production of sawnwood are 
population and GDP growth, which lead to significant increases in the demand for sawnwood 
in Asia, South America and Africa. An increased bioenergy demand level was found to be 
particularly beneficial for industries producing sawnwood and plywood, as the demand for 
their wood-based industrial by-products (i.e. sawdust, shavings, bark, industrial wood chips) 
increases. These industrial sectors can provide large amounts of by-products to be used for 
bioenergy production and the increase in bioenergy demand leads to an increase in the 
production of the sawnwood and plywood commodities. On the other hand, the higher 
bioenergy demand is expected to inhibit fibreboard and mechanical pulp production as these 
are major consumers of industrial by-products. It can be noted that the same effect of 
increasing bioenergy demand on the material sectors was already shown to be the case for 
the EU in Forsell et al. (2016). 
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Figure 29. Expected global production of woody materials under the baseline 
scenario (SSP2 RCP-Baseline) (left column), and change in production (in %) 
under the 2 °C scenario (SSP2 RCP-2.6), compared to the baseline scenario (right 
column). 
 
  
 
For the right column, positive values show that production is expected to be higher in the 2 
°C scenario than in the baseline scenario. Source: Lauri et al. (2017). 
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Appendix I: Overview 
of models, scenarios 
and regions 
Table 12: Overview of models, scenarios and covered regions for total greenhouse 
gas emissions, before scenario selection, i.e. including models with projections up 
to 2050 (GEM-E3 only has projections up to 2030) 
Delayed (2020) Number of scenarios 
Region 
Number of 
models 
DNE21+ 
V.12A 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_Wo
rld 
IMAG
E 2.4 
MESSA
GE V.4 
POLES 
GECO201
6 
REMIN
D 1.5 
WITCH
2013 
ASIA 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Brazil 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Canad
a 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
China 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EU 5 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
India 5 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Indone
sia 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Japan 4 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
LAM 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MAF 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mexico 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
OECD9
0+EU 5 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
REF 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
ROWO 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Russia 4 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
South 
Africa 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
South 
Korea 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Turkey 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
USA 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
World 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
  
PBL | 84  
Delayed (2030) Number of scenarios 
Region 
Number of 
models 
DNE21+ 
V.12A 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_Wo
rld 
IMAG
E 2.4 
MESSA
GE V.4 
POLES 
GECO201
6 
REMIN
D 1.5 
WITCH
2013 
ASIA 4 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 
Brazil 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canad
a 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China 4 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 
EU 3 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 
India 3 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Indone
sia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 
LAM 4 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 
MAF 4 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 
Mexico 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OECD9
0+EU 4 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 
REF 3 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 
ROWO 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Russia 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 
South 
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
Korea 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USA 4 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 
World 4 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 
 
 
  
 PBL | 85 
  Delayed (2030) Delayed (2020)    
Model Region 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
HST 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
LST 
LIMITS-RefPol-
450 
Delayed 
450 2C 
Count 
(2020) 
Count 
(2030) 
Count 
(total) 
DNE21+ V.12A ASIA x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World ASIA       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 ASIA     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 ASIA x x x     1 2 3 
POLES GECO2016 ASIA         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 ASIA x x x     1 2 3 
WITCH2013 ASIA x x x     1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A Brazil x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Brazil       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 Brazil     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Brazil           0 0 0 
POLES GECO2016 Brazil         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 Brazil           0 0 0 
WITCH2013 Brazil           0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A Canada x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Canada       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 Canada     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Canada           0 0 0 
POLES GECO2016 Canada         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 Canada           0 0 0 
WITCH2013 Canada           0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A China x x       0 2 2 
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  Delayed (2030) Delayed (2020)    
Model Region 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
HST 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
LST 
LIMITS-RefPol-
450 
Delayed 
450 2C 
Count 
(2020) 
Count 
(2030) 
Count 
(total) 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World China       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 China     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 China x x x     1 2 3 
POLES GECO2016 China         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 China x x x     1 2 3 
WITCH2013 China x x x     1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A EU x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World EU       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 EU     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 EU           0 0 0 
POLES GECO2016 EU         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 EU x x x     1 2 3 
WITCH2013 EU x x x     1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A India x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World India       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 India     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 India           0 0 0 
POLES GECO2016 India         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 India x x x     1 2 3 
WITCH2013 India x x x     1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A Japan x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Japan       x   1 0 1 
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  Delayed (2030) Delayed (2020)    
Model Region 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
HST 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
LST 
LIMITS-RefPol-
450 
Delayed 
450 2C 
Count 
(2020) 
Count 
(2030) 
Count 
(total) 
IMAGE 2.4 Japan     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Japan           0 0 0 
POLES GECO2016 Japan         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 Japan x x x     1 2 3 
WITCH2013 Japan           0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A LAM x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World LAM       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 LAM     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 LAM x x x     1 2 3 
POLES GECO2016 LAM         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 LAM x x x     1 2 3 
WITCH2013 LAM x x x     1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A MAF x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World MAF       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 MAF     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 MAF x x x     1 2 3 
POLES GECO2016 MAF         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 MAF x x x     1 2 3 
WITCH2013 MAF x x x     1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A Mexico x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Mexico       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 Mexico     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Mexico           0 0 0 
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  Delayed (2030) Delayed (2020)    
Model Region 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
HST 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
LST 
LIMITS-RefPol-
450 
Delayed 
450 2C 
Count 
(2020) 
Count 
(2030) 
Count 
(total) 
POLES GECO2016 Mexico         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 Mexico           0 0 0 
WITCH2013 Mexico           0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A OECD90+EU x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World OECD90+EU           0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 OECD90+EU     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 OECD90+EU x x x     1 2 3 
POLES GECO2016 OECD90+EU         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 OECD90+EU x x x     1 2 3 
WITCH2013 OECD90+EU x x x     1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A REF x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World REF       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 REF     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 REF x x x     1 2 3 
POLES GECO2016 REF         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 REF           0 0 0 
WITCH2013 REF x x x     1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A Russia x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Russia       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 Russia     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Russia           0 0 0 
POLES GECO2016 Russia         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 Russia x x x     1 2 3 
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  Delayed (2030) Delayed (2020)    
Model Region 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
HST 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
LST 
LIMITS-RefPol-
450 
Delayed 
450 2C 
Count 
(2020) 
Count 
(2030) 
Count 
(total) 
WITCH2013 Russia           0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A 
South 
Korea x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World 
South 
Korea       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 
South 
Korea     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 
South 
Korea           0 0 0 
POLES GECO2016 
South 
Korea         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 
South 
Korea           0 0 0 
WITCH2013 
South 
Korea           0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A Turkey x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Turkey       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 Turkey     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Turkey           0 0 0 
POLES GECO2016 Turkey         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 Turkey           0 0 0 
WITCH2013 Turkey           0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A USA x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World USA       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 USA     x     1 0 1 
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  Delayed (2030) Delayed (2020)    
Model Region 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
HST 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
LST 
LIMITS-RefPol-
450 
Delayed 
450 2C 
Count 
(2020) 
Count 
(2030) 
Count 
(total) 
MESSAGE V.4 USA x x x     1 2 3 
POLES GECO2016 USA         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 USA x x x     1 2 3 
WITCH2013 USA x x x     1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A World x x       0 2 2 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World World       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 World     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 World x x x     1 2 3 
POLES GECO2016 World         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 World x x x     1 2 3 
WITCH2013 World x x x     1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A Indonesia           0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Indonesia       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 Indonesia     x     1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Indonesia           0 0 0 
POLES GECO2016 Indonesia         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 Indonesia           0 0 0 
WITCH2013 Indonesia           0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A 
South 
Africa           0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World 
South 
Africa       x   1 0 1 
IMAGE 2.4 
South 
Africa     x     1 0 1 
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  Delayed (2030) Delayed (2020)    
Model Region 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
HST 
AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
LST 
LIMITS-RefPol-
450 
Delayed 
450 2C 
Count 
(2020) 
Count 
(2030) 
Count 
(total) 
MESSAGE V.4 
South 
Africa           0 0 0 
POLES GECO2016 
South 
Africa         x 1 0 1 
REMIND 1.5 
South 
Africa           0 0 0 
WITCH2013 
South 
Africa           0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A ROWO           0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World ROWO           0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 ROWO           0 0 0 
MESSAGE V.4 ROWO           0 0 0 
POLES GECO2016 ROWO           0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 ROWO x x x     1 2 3 
WITCH2013 ROWO           0 0 0 
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Table 13: Overview of models, scenarios and covered regions for total greenhouse 
gas emissions, after scenario selection, i.e. only including models with projections 
up to 2100 
Delayed (2020) Number of scenarios 
Region 
Number of 
models 
DNE21+ 
V.12A 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_Wo
rld 
IMAG
E 2.4 
MESSA
GE V.4 
POLES 
GECO201
6 
REMIN
D 1.5 
WITCH
2013 
ASIA 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Brazil 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Canad
a 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
China 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
EU 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
India 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Indone
sia 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Japan 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
LAM 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
MAF 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Mexico 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
OECD9
0+EU 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
REF 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
ROWO 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Russia 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
South 
Africa 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
South 
Korea 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
USA 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
World 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
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Delayed (2030) Number of scenarios 
Region 
Number of 
models 
DNE21+ 
V.12A 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_Wo
rld 
IMAG
E 2.4 
MESSA
GE V.4 
POLES 
GECO201
6 
REMIN
D 1.5 
WITCH
2013 
ASIA 3 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canad
a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China 3 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 
EU 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
India 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Indone
sia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
LAM 3 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 
MAF 3 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OECD9
0+EU 3 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 
REF 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
ROWO 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Russia 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
South 
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USA 3 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 
World 3 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 
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  Delayed (2030) 
Delayed 
(2020)    
Model Region 
AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-HST 
AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-LST 
LIMITS-
RefPol-
450 
Count 
(Delayed 
2020) 
Count 
(Delayed 
2030) Count 
DNE21+ V.12A ASIA       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World ASIA       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 ASIA     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 ASIA x x x 1 2 3 
POLES 
GECO2016 ASIA       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 ASIA x x x 1 2 3 
WITCH2013 ASIA x x x 1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A Brazil       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Brazil       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 Brazil     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Brazil       0 0 0 
POLES 
GECO2016 Brazil       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 Brazil       0 0 0 
WITCH2013 Brazil       0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A Canada       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Canada       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 Canada     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Canada       0 0 0 
POLES 
GECO2016 Canada       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 Canada       0 0 0 
WITCH2013 Canada       0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A China       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World China       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 China     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 China x x x 1 2 3 
POLES 
GECO2016 China       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 China x x x 1 2 3 
WITCH2013 China x x x 1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A EU       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World EU       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 EU     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 EU       0 0 0 
POLES 
GECO2016 EU       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 EU x x x 1 2 3 
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  Delayed (2030) 
Delayed 
(2020)    
Model Region 
AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-HST 
AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-LST 
LIMITS-
RefPol-
450 
Count 
(Delayed 
2020) 
Count 
(Delayed 
2030) Count 
WITCH2013 EU x x x 1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A India       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World India       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 India     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 India       0 0 0 
POLES 
GECO2016 India       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 India x x x 1 2 3 
WITCH2013 India x x x 1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A Japan       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Japan       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 Japan     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Japan       0 0 0 
POLES 
GECO2016 Japan       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 Japan x x x 1 2 3 
WITCH2013 Japan       0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A LAM       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World LAM       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 LAM     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 LAM x x x 1 2 3 
POLES 
GECO2016 LAM       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 LAM x x x 1 2 3 
WITCH2013 LAM x x x 1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A MAF       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World MAF       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 MAF     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 MAF x x x 1 2 3 
POLES 
GECO2016 MAF       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 MAF x x x 1 2 3 
WITCH2013 MAF x x x 1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A Mexico       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Mexico       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 Mexico     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Mexico       0 0 0 
POLES 
GECO2016 Mexico       0 0 0 
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  Delayed (2030) 
Delayed 
(2020)    
Model Region 
AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-HST 
AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-LST 
LIMITS-
RefPol-
450 
Count 
(Delayed 
2020) 
Count 
(Delayed 
2030) Count 
REMIND 1.5 Mexico       0 0 0 
WITCH2013 Mexico       0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A OECD90+EU       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World OECD90+EU       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 OECD90+EU     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 OECD90+EU x x x 1 2 3 
POLES 
GECO2016 OECD90+EU       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 OECD90+EU x x x 1 2 3 
WITCH2013 OECD90+EU x x x 1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A REF       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World REF       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 REF     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 REF x x x 1 2 3 
POLES 
GECO2016 REF       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 REF       0 0 0 
WITCH2013 REF x x x 1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A Russia       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Russia       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 Russia     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Russia       0 0 0 
POLES 
GECO2016 Russia       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 Russia x x x 1 2 3 
WITCH2013 Russia       0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A 
South 
Korea       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World 
South 
Korea       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 
South 
Korea     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 
South 
Korea       0 0 0 
POLES 
GECO2016 
South 
Korea       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 
South 
Korea       0 0 0 
WITCH2013 
South 
Korea       0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A Turkey       0 0 0 
  
 PBL | 97 
  Delayed (2030) 
Delayed 
(2020)    
Model Region 
AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-HST 
AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-LST 
LIMITS-
RefPol-
450 
Count 
(Delayed 
2020) 
Count 
(Delayed 
2030) Count 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Turkey       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 Turkey     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Turkey       0 0 0 
POLES 
GECO2016 Turkey       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 Turkey       0 0 0 
WITCH2013 Turkey       0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A USA       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World USA       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 USA     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 USA x x x 1 2 3 
POLES 
GECO2016 USA       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 USA x x x 1 2 3 
WITCH2013 USA x x x 1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A World       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World World       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 World     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 World x x x 1 2 3 
POLES 
GECO2016 World       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 World x x x 1 2 3 
WITCH2013 World x x x 1 2 3 
DNE21+ V.12A Indonesia       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World Indonesia       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 Indonesia     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 Indonesia       0 0 0 
POLES 
GECO2016 Indonesia       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 Indonesia       0 0 0 
WITCH2013 Indonesia       0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A 
South 
Africa       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World 
South 
Africa       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 
South 
Africa     x 1 0 1 
MESSAGE V.4 
South 
Africa       0 0 0 
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  Delayed (2030) 
Delayed 
(2020)    
Model Region 
AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-HST 
AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-LST 
LIMITS-
RefPol-
450 
Count 
(Delayed 
2020) 
Count 
(Delayed 
2030) Count 
POLES 
GECO2016 
South 
Africa       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 
South 
Africa       0 0 0 
WITCH2013 
South 
Africa       0 0 0 
DNE21+ V.12A ROWO       0 0 0 
GEM-
E3_IPTS_World ROWO       0 0 0 
IMAGE 2.4 ROWO       0 0 0 
MESSAGE V.4 ROWO       0 0 0 
POLES 
GECO2016 ROWO       0 0 0 
REMIND 1.5 ROWO x x x 1 2 3 
WITCH2013 ROWO       0 0 0 
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Appendix II: Region 
definitions 
 
OECD90+EU Includes the OECD 1990 countries as well as EU members and candidates. 
Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, French Polynesia, Germany, 
Greece, Guam, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Macedonia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, Vanuatu  
REF Countries from the Reforming Economies of the Former Soviet Union. 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, 
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan  
ASIA The region includes most Asian countries with the exception of the Middle East, Japan 
and Former Soviet Union states. 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, China Hong Kong 
SAR, China Macao SAR, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, East Timor, India, Indonesia, 
Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Viet Nam  
MAF This region includes the countries of the Middle East and Africa. 
Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Reunion, Rwanda, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Western 
Sahara, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe  
LAM This region includes the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Puerto Rico, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela  
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Appendix III: Reduction targets 
Table 14: Projected regional greenhouse gas emissions (including LULUCF CO2) by 2030 and 2050, relative to 2010, in delayed mitigation 
450 ppm CO2eq scenarios (negative numbers denote a reduction), using the full set of models (including models with projections up to 
2050, and for 2030 including GEM-E3, which has projections up to 2030). Source: LIMITS and AMPERE databases (Kriegler, 2014c; Riahi 
et al., 2015) 
GHG emissions relative to 
2010 (%) 
2030 2050 
Scenario Region Min 10th 
percent
ile 
Mean Median 90th 
percent
ile 
Max Min 10th 
percent
ile 
Mean Median 90th 
percent
ile 
Max 
Delayed (2020) ASIA -31 -17 2 5 20 21 -63 -63 -52 -52 -41 -39 
Delayed (2020) China -22 -18 0 -3 20 21 -78 -78 -64 -67 -47 -45 
Delayed (2020) EU -49 -44 -35 -33 -29 -29 -77 -76 -75 -74 -73 -73 
Delayed (2020) India -13 10 43 51 69 81 -36 -36 -24 -25 -11 -8 
Delayed (2020) Japan -36 -33 -26 -24 -21 -21 -95 -92 -84 -81 -77 -76 
Delayed (2020) LAM -54 -52 -29 -36 0 17 -137 -114 -82 -71 -61 -59 
Delayed (2020) MAF -21 -4 20 17 46 67 -43 -36 -13 -18 18 38 
Delayed (2020) OECD90+EU -47 -41 -34 -30 -30 -29 -84 -84 -80 -81 -77 -76 
Delayed (2020) REF -47 -40 -22 -15 -8 -5 -81 -80 -69 -72 -55 -50 
Delayed (2020) Russia -37 -33 -23 -23 -14 -11 -93 -91 -75 -80 -58 -52 
Delayed (2020) USA -64 -50 -38 -34 -31 -30 -88 -87 -85 -85 -84 -83 
Delayed (2020) World -39 -26 -12 -10 0 2 -73 -70 -61 -59 -52 -47 
Delayed (2030) ASIA 9 15 28 33 37 37 -53 -52 -44 -48 -32 -27 
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GHG emissions relative to 
2010 (%) 
2030 2050 
Scenario Region Min 10th 
percent
ile 
Mean Median 90th 
percent
ile 
Max Min 10th 
percent
ile 
Mean Median 90th 
percent
ile 
Max 
Delayed (2030) China 23 26 36 33 48 54 -64 -63 -58 -58 -52 -50 
Delayed (2030) EU -12 -11 -5 -10 3 7 -85 -83 -74 -76 -64 -61 
Delayed (2030) India 53 61 79 92 93 93 -19 -16 -3 -8 12 17 
Delayed (2030) Japan -22 -20 -12 -12 -4 -2 -77 -76 -75 -75 -73 -73 
Delayed (2030) LAM -19 -9 7 14 17 18 -99 -90 -69 -63 -53 -51 
Delayed (2030) MAF 19 24 35 38 43 45 -105 -79 -34 -14 -5 -3 
Delayed (2030) OECD90+EU -14 -14 -8 -9 -1 0 -84 -83 -76 -76 -68 -67 
Delayed (2030) REF -17 -14 -4 -2 4 6 -83 -82 -75 -74 -70 -69 
Delayed (2030) Russia -17 -15 -6 -6 3 5 -77 -77 -77 -77 -77 -77 
Delayed (2030) USA -19 -18 -13 -14 -7 -5 -89 -88 -79 -79 -71 -70 
Delayed (2030) World 12 12 15 14 17 18 -69 -67 -56 -56 -45 -43 
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Appendix IV: 
Harmonisation 
There are three harmonisation methods in the literature (Rogelj et al., 2011): offset 
harmonisation (a constant absolute factor to match 2010 emissions), uniform scaling 
harmonisation (a constant scaling factor to match 2010 emissions), and tapered scaling 
harmonisation (in which the scaling factor starts from the same point as the scaling 
harmonisation method, but the scaling is relaxed from the starting year over time until a 
match is reached). The projected 2030 emission level resulting from the offset harmonisation 
method generally lies in the middle of the range of outcomes of the three harmonisation 
methods (Rogelj et al., 2011), making it an appropriate choice for giving a first indication of 
the effect of harmonisation. However, for emissions that tend to go to zero, the offset 
method is no longer the approach that gives outcomes somewhere in the middle of the 
outcomes of all three harmonization methods. In such cases, a scaling harmonisation, or a 
tapered scaling harmonisation approach, could be used as alternative, as both approaches 
lead to a lower impact on emission projections due to scaling factors going to zero.  
 
For this report, we focus on harmonizing the LULUCF CO2 emissions only, and although these 
do tend to go to zero across models, we use a simple offset-method for harmonisation to 
show the other extreme, as opposed to no harmonisation. For example, China, the EU and 
the United States report carbon sinks for managed forests (US: -1 GtCO2), which are 
projected to remain more or less the same in future. For these countries harmonisation to 
only LULUCF emissions/removals is expected to have a relatively large effect. Indeed, there 
are large differences between inventory data and IPCC/FAO model data in LULUCF 
emissions/removals estimates. This issue is well explained by Grassi et al. (2017), showing 
there is a difference of more than 3 GtCO2 in 2010 in LULUCF emissions, largely due to 
different definitions and category inclusions.  
 
Table 15. Median phase-out year for greenhouse gas emissions (upper table) and 
CO2 emissions (lower table), per scenario and per region for the harmonisation 
cases (see Section 3.3).  
Results are only presented for regions covered by at least two models. Numbers should be 
interpreted with care, as models generally report their emission projections in 10-year time 
steps. 
 
Scenario Region [no. of 
models] 
No 
harmonisation 
Harmonisation of CO2 from 
LULUCF 
Delayed 450 ASIA [4 models] No phase-out - 
Delayed 
450_2030 
ASIA [4 models] No phase-out - 
Delayed 450 China [4 models] 2100 2090 
Delayed 
450_2030 
China [4 models] 2100 2095 
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Delayed 450 EU [3 models] No phase-out 2080 
Delayed 
450_2030 
EU [3 models] No phase-out 2085 
Delayed 450 India [3 models] No phase-out No phase-out 
Delayed 
450_2030 
India [3 models] No phase-out No phase-out 
Delayed 450 Japan [2 models] 2065 2065 
Delayed 
450_2030 
Japan [2 models] 2075 2065 
Delayed 450 LAM [4 models] 2075 - 
Delayed 
450_2030 
LAM [4 models] 2070 - 
Delayed 450 MAF [4 models] No phase-out - 
Delayed 
450_2030 
MAF [4 models] No phase-out - 
Delayed 450 OECD90+EU [4 
models] 
2080 - 
Delayed 
450_2030 
OECD90+EU [4 
models] 
2085 - 
Delayed 450 REF [3 models] No phase-out - 
Delayed 
450_2030 
REF [3 models] 2080 - 
Delayed 450 Russia [2 models] 2085 2077.5 
Delayed 
450_2030 
Russia [2 models] 2060 2050 
Delayed 450 USA [4 models] 2065 2060 
Delayed 
450_2030 
USA [4 models] 2070 2060 
Delayed 450 World [4 models] 2100 2085 
Delayed 
450_2030 
World [4 models] 2100 2090 
 
Scenario Region [no. of 
models] 
No 
harmonisation 
Harmonisation of CO2 from 
LULUCF 
Delayed 450 ASIA [4 models] 2080 - 
Delayed 
450_2030 
ASIA [4 models] 2085 - 
Delayed 450 China [4 models] 2075 2070 
Delayed 
450_2030 
China [4 models] 2090 2082.5 
Delayed 450 EU [3 models] 2080 2060 
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Delayed 
450_2030 
EU [3 models] 2082.5 2067.5 
Delayed 450 India [3 models] 2090 2080 
Delayed 
450_2030 
India [3 models] 2100 2087.5 
Delayed 450 Japan [2 models] 2055 2060 
Delayed 
450_2030 
Japan [2 models] 2065 2060 
Delayed 450 LAM [4 models] 2060 - 
Delayed 
450_2030 
LAM [4 models] 2060 - 
Delayed 450 MAF [4 models] 2060 - 
Delayed 
450_2030 
MAF [4 models] 2062.5 - 
Delayed 450 OECD90+EU [4 
models] 
2065 - 
Delayed 
450_2030 
OECD90+EU [4 
models] 
2067.5 - 
Delayed 450 REF [3 models] No phase-out - 
Delayed 
450_2030 
REF [3 models] 2060 - 
Delayed 450 Russia [2 models] 2080 2057.5 
Delayed 
450_2030 
Russia [2 models] 2060 2045 
Delayed 450 USA [4 models] 2060 2047.5 
Delayed 
450_2030 
USA [4 models] 2060 2055 
Delayed 450 World [4 models] 2065 2065 
Delayed 
450_2030 
World [4 models] 2070 2060 
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Appendix V: Regional 
graphs of the 
breakdown of 
emissions in the 
phase-out year 
This section shows graphs of the breakdown of emissions in the phase-out year, for countries 
that were not included in Section 3.4. Only regions covered by at least two models are 
shown. The following applies to all graphs: for models with multiple scenarios within a 
category (delayed 2030), the mean was taken (in the upper graph, separately for sets of 
scenarios with different phase-out years). The phase-out year for greenhouse gas emissions 
is indicated per model (upper graph). The lower graph also includes models that do not 
project a phase-out of greenhouse gas emissions and therefore did not show in the upper 
graph. See Figure 5 for a further explanation of the categories, if needed. Source: own 
calculations based on the LIMITS and AMPERE databases (Kriegler et al., 2014c; Riahi et al., 
2015). 
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Figure 30. Breakdown of emissions (MtCO2eq) in China, in the phase-out year for 
greenhouse gas (upper graph) and in 2100 (lower graph), for delayed mitigation 
450 ppm CO2eq scenarios (2020 and 2030).  
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Figure 31. Breakdown of emissions (MtCO2eq) in India, in 2100 , for delayed 
mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios (2020 and 2030). 
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Figure 32. Breakdown of emissions (MtCO2eq) in Japan, in the phase-out year for 
greenhouse gas (upper graph) and in 2100 (lower graph), for delayed mitigation 
450 ppm CO2eq scenarios (2020 and 2030). 
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Figure 33. Breakdown of emissions (MtCO2eq) in Russia, in 2100, for delayed 
mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios (2020 and 2030). 
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Figure 34. Breakdown of emissions (MtCO2eq) in the United States, in the phase-
out year, for greenhouse gas (upper graph) and in 2100 (lower graph), for delayed 
mitigation 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios (2020 and 2030). 
 
 
 
 
